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Abstract 
Following the destruction of the 2004 tsunami in Thailand, a major reconstruction 
effort was undertaken.  This project investigated the relationships between the 
reconstruction approaches used by organizations and the social vulnerabilities villagers 
experienced in Thailand following the reconstruction effort.  We found that certain 
reconstruction approaches resulted in houses that did not meet villagers’ needs and 
increased their vulnerabilities.  Recommendations were made to government agencies 
and NGOs for improving future reconstruction efforts and to researchers to explore gaps 
in knowledge. 
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Executive Summary 
On December 26, 2004 a tsunami struck the southwest coast of Thailand, causing 
many casualties and much destruction of infrastructure across six provinces in Southern 
Thailand – Ranong, Phang Nga, Phuket, Krabi, Trang, and Satun.  Immediately following 
the tsunami, relief organizations, including both NGOs and the Thai government, began 
rebuilding the affected area.  The goal of this project was to understand the relationships 
between the approaches used by organizations to plan and implement the reconstruction 
and changes to villagers’ social vulnerabilities that are associated with the reconstruction.  
Also, we wanted to identify important social demographics that have influenced the 
changes in social vulnerabilities brought about by the reconstruction effort. 
In the context of our project, social vulnerability refers to an inability to cope with 
stresses that act on a person or community’s assets or livelihoods (Thailand Burma 
Border Consortium, 2004).  An example of a social vulnerability is dependency, where a 
person may be dependent on outside agencies for house repairs because he or she lacks 
the necessary knowledge and/or skills.  It has been noted by scholars that vulnerability is 
influenced by the cultural and social attributes of a community (Dynes, De Marchi, & 
Pelanda, 1987).  Some examples of such attributes, which we call “social demographics,” 
are socioeconomic status, ethnicity, education, and occupation (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 
2003).   
Research Methods 
Our objectives consisted of determining how the approaches used by the 
reconstruction organizations affected changes in villagers’ social vulnerabilities and 
identifying important social demographics that have influenced these changes.  To do 
this, we investigated the following research questions: 
• What processes did the organizations use to plan and implement reconstruction in 
the Ranong and Phang Nga provinces? 
• What changes to the villagers’ social vulnerabilities occurred after the tsunami? 
• How are the changes in social vulnerabilities related to the reconstruction 
approaches uses by the organizations? 
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Answering our first research question allowed us to understand the reconstruction 
processes used by organizations, while answering our second research question allowed 
us to understand the changes in villagers’ social vulnerabilities that occurred after the 
tsunami.  Our last research question helped us to relate the changes in social 
vulnerabilities to the reconstruction approaches used by organizations, therefore allowing 
us to make comparisons and establish causal relationships between the processes used by 
organizations and the resulting affects upon vulnerabilities.   
In order to answer our three research questions, we performed in-depth research 
through case studies of six villages in the Ranong and Phang Nga provinces, and broader 
research about villages and organizations through the use of archival research and 
interviews with organizations.  We identified the reconstruction approaches used in the 
villages by performing semi-structured interviews with representatives of three different 
organizations and also by performing interviews with villagers, where possible.  We used 
semi-structured interviews with villagers (in case study villages) to understand the 
changes in their social vulnerabilities.  To better relate the reconstruction approaches to 
the changes in villagers’ vulnerabilities, we created a database in Microsoft Access that 
we used as a tool to organize the information we gathered. 
Findings 
 We have divided our findings into three categories: reconstruction approaches 
used by organizations, changes in villagers’ social vulnerabilities, and analysis of the 
relationships between reconstruction approaches and social vulnerabilities.  The last 
category describes our central findings because this section details the causal 
relationships between the approaches used by organizations and the changes in social 
vulnerabilities.  
Reconstruction Approaches Used by Organizations 
We have found that the level of involvement of villagers in the design and/or 
physical reconstruction of the houses varied by organization.  Some organizations, such 
as the Rotary Club of Patong Beach, allowed villagers to individually design and build 
their own houses, while others, such as the Thai government, did not include villagers in 
either the design or construction.  We found that organizations relocated some villages 
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due to safety and/or land ownership issues because they were either located in the 
tsunami inundation zone and/or on land that did not belong to the villagers.  We found 
that during the reconstruction effort, there was little coordination among the central and 
provincial governments.  We found that there was also little coordination between 
government agencies and NGOs.  We found that, in some cases, organizations may have 
used unsafe materials or construction techniques.  We also found that in addition to 
rebuilding homes, some organizations, such as Save Andaman, have helped to restore 
villagers’ livelihoods. 
Changes to Villagers’ Social Vulnerabilities 
We found that some villagers are unable to perform repairs on their new houses 
because they have little knowledge of the materials and construction techniques used or 
do not have access to the proper materials.  Therefore, villagers have an increased 
dependency on others.  We found that some reconstructed houses have not met the 
specific needs and wants of the villagers.  For example, many homes were built with an 
open kitchen, which creates problems during the rainy season.  We found that when 
villagers were relocated from coastal areas, they experienced changes in vulnerabilities.  
These include changes in vulnerability from economic strains, occupational shifts, new 
land ownership, and modernization.  We also found that some villagers do not trust the 
structural integrity of their houses because they feel certain structures are unstable or 
poorly constructed.   
Analysis of the Relationship between Reconstruction Approaches and Changes to 
Villagers’ Social Vulnerabilities 
We found that when villagers were not involved in the reconstruction process, 
they tended to become more dependent on others for house modifications and repairs.  
When organizations did not involve villagers in the design and construction of the 
houses, villagers were more dependent on outside resources because they were either 
unfamiliar with the materials and construction techniques used or did not have access to 
the proper materials. 
We found that when villagers were not involved in the reconstruction process, 
they felt that their houses did not suit their needs and wants.  In these cases, villagers 
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were unable to communicate such needs and wants to organizations because they were 
not involved in the reconstruction process.   
We found that when villagers were relocated due to land ownership or safety 
issues, they experienced changes in social vulnerabilities.  Villagers experienced an 
increased vulnerability to economic stresses due to occupational shifts and new economic 
strains.  Some villagers also experienced a decreased vulnerability to eviction due to new 
land ownership. 
We identified occupation, income, and family structure as being important social 
demographics that influenced changes in social vulnerabilities brought about by the 
reconstruction effort.  For example, we have found that when some villagers were 
relocated further from the sea, they were unable to fish as frequently as before the 
tsunami, which increased their vulnerability to economic stresses because they had a 
decrease in income.  Also, some houses that were built did not meet villagers’ needs for 
their family sizes and age distributions.  Some houses were two stories, which caused 
problems for elderly family members, and some did not provide sufficient space for 
villagers’ family sizes.  The social vulnerabilities that were influenced by occupation, 
income, and family structure, were a result of the specific reconstruction approaches that 
were used.  
Recommendations 
Based on our findings and background research, we offer a series of 
recommendations for NGOs and government agencies to improve the outcome of future 
reconstruction efforts so houses meet residents’ needs and do not increase vulnerabilities.  
We also offer a set of recommendations for future researchers to explore gaps in 
knowledge that we have identified. 
Recommendations for Organizations:   
NGOs and/or government agencies should seek to involve the affected community 
in the design and physical construction of their houses.  Our findings show that when the 
community is not involved in the reconstruction process, the houses did not suit their 
needs and wants and villagers were unable to perform necessary repairs.  Previous 
research has shown that involvement of the community will ensure the houses meet their 
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needs.  For example, following an earthquake in Guatemala, residents designed and built 
their own houses and were pleased with the outcomes (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989).  
Studies of other tsunami affected villages have also shown that when residents were not 
involved in the reconstruction process they lacked knowledge of the materials and 
construction techniques (DeMasi et al., 2006).  Therefore, we recommend that 
organizations involve the community in both the design and physical construction to 
ensure that houses meet the needs and wants of residents and to ensure that residents will 
have the knowledge to make necessary repairs. 
If a community must be relocated, NGOs and/or government agencies should 
choose the location that minimizes negative impacts on residents’ lives and livelihoods.  
We have found that when villagers were relocated, some experienced increased 
vulnerabilities to economic stresses and occupational shifts.  Therefore, we recommend 
that during relocation, organizations consider all possible locations and choose the one 
that will be least likely to disrupt residents’ lives and livelihoods. 
When NGOs and/or government agencies make decisions regarding the 
relocation or design of houses, they should consider the social demographics of the 
community, specifically occupation, income, and family structure.  We have found that 
occupation, income, and family structure are important social demographics that 
influenced changes in vulnerabilities.  In order to design houses that fit the cultural and 
social needs of the residents, we recommend that organizations consider the social 
demographics of the community. 
Coordination among government agencies should be improved.  We found that 
there was a lack of coordination between the provincial and central governments, 
therefore causing miscommunications.  Improved coordination among government 
agencies will help prevent miscommunications in the event of a future disaster.  This will 
ensure that the government-built houses better suit the needs of the affected people. 
Coordination between government agencies and NGOs should be improved.  We 
have found that there was little coordination between NGOs that performed 
reconstruction and government agencies, which resulted in a lack of records of the 
reconstruction at the national level.  We recommend that future relief efforts are better 
coordinated in order to ensure that they run smoothly. 
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Recommendations for Future Researchers:  
Researchers should continue gathering information regarding the reconstruction 
effort in other villages to determine if our findings can be generalized.  We recommend 
that additional villages and organizations be studied in other tsunami-affected areas in 
order to determine if our findings can be generalized throughout tsunami-affected 
Thailand.  Also, we recommend that the database be continuously updated as additional 
information is gathered.   
Researchers should explore the relationships between organizations’ efforts to 
restore livelihoods and changes in villagers’ social vulnerabilities.   We hypothesize that 
organizations that have helped to restore villagers’ livelihoods have, in turn, alleviated 
some social vulnerabilities brought about by the reconstruction effort.  Since we were not 
able to fully explore this issue, future researchers should explore how the restoration of 
livelihoods has affected changes in vulnerabilities   Researchers should also focus on 
understanding how the processes of livelihood restoration were coordinated with housing 
reconstruction.   
Researchers should further investigate the processes of coordination among 
government agencies used during the reconstruction effort.  Since we were not able to 
fully understand the process of coordination among government agencies, it is important 
that future researchers determine this process so recommendations can be made to 
government officials.   
Researchers should assess the physical safety of the construction techniques and 
materials used in the houses to determine the dangers villagers face.  Although we were 
not qualified to assess the structural integrity of the houses, we did notice that many 
houses appeared unsafe.  We recommend that future researchers aim to assess the 
physical safety of the houses in order to understand the risks villagers face. 
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Summary 
Based on our research we have found that, in some cases, the reconstruction 
approaches used resulted in houses that did not suit the needs and wants of the villagers 
and have increased their social vulnerabilities.  The recommendations we have offered 
organizations are intended to improve future reconstruction efforts by ensuring that the 
houses meet the needs and wants of the residents and that they do not cause an increase in 
social vulnerabilities.  Our recommendations for future researchers are intended to help 
broaden the scope of information about the reconstruction effort, as well as to explore 
gaps in information that we have identified.  With this information, it is our hope that 
future reconstruction efforts will better meet disaster victims’ long-term needs by 
providing them with houses that they can call their own. 
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1 Introduction 
 Natural disasters cause devastating destruction.  A disaster occurs when a risk or 
hazard exceeds a society’s ability to cope with its effects (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989).  
An estimated 80,000 people are killed annually by natural disasters (Walter, 2002) – 
approximately 97% of these deaths occur in third world countries (Schilderman, 2004).  
In the 1990s alone, natural disasters caused economic losses amounting to $63 billion 
USD.  It is predicted that this number could soon increase to $300 billion USD due to 
global warming related disasters (Walter, 2002).  The degree of damage caused by a 
disaster is related to the vulnerabilities of the affected area, where vulnerabilities refer to 
the susceptibility of people both physically and socially (Cannon, Rowell, & Twigg, 
2003). 
 After a natural disaster strikes an area, relief and recovery efforts are undertaken 
to restore the community to a functional state, but often “disaster relief and recovery 
assistance fails to take into account the need to support livelihoods and future resistance 
to hazards” (Adger, 2001, pg. 5).  In many cases, organizations are more focused on 
meeting the immediate needs of the victims, rather than lessening future vulnerabilities 
(Anderson & Woodrow, 1989).  These vulnerabilities can be physical, such as increased 
exposure to wind, rain, sun, future disasters, etc., or social, such as societal dependencies 
or deficiencies that damage social structure (Cannon et al., 2003). 
 On December 26, 2004 a devastating tsunami struck the southwest coast of 
Thailand, killing approximately 8,300 people and damaging 407 villages, with 47 
completely or mostly destroyed.  In the major relief effort following the tsunami, many 
organizations (both governmental and non-governmental) began to reconstruct the houses 
that were destroyed throughout the affected area.  These reconstruction organizations 
were able to provide housing to many displaced families in a relatively short period of 
time.   
However, in a recent study, DeMasi, LeBlanc, O’Dowd, and Peyser (2006) 
discovered that the reconstruction performed by the Thai government in the villages of 
Ban Tub Nua and Ban Hat Sai Khao of the Ranong Province increased both the physical 
and social vulnerabilities of its residents.  The new houses increased their vulnerabilities 
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to rain, wind, sun, and also future tsunamis.  Additionally, they found that villagers were 
unable to maintain and repair their houses when needed because they are unfamiliar with 
the new construction techniques and the materials used by reconstruction organizations 
(DeMasi et al., 2006).    
Although DeMasi et al. (2006) have identified many concerns in the villages of 
Ban Tub Nua and Ban Hat Sai Khao, their findings only represent the cases of two 
villages.  It was left unclear whether such negative effects of the reconstruction effort are 
present in other villages that were reconstructed in Thailand.  This leads to the question 
of how the reconstruction approaches used by organizations influenced villagers’ 
vulnerabilities.   
In this project, we explored the relationships between the reconstruction 
approaches used and changes in villagers’ vulnerabilities by focusing on the 
reconstruction of residential houses in the Ranong and Phang Nga provinces.  We 
gathered information regarding the processes used by organizations to plan and 
implement the reconstruction in order to determine how these processes may have caused 
changes in vulnerabilities.  We hypothesized that the social demographics of the 
communities (the social and cultural characteristics of the population) were not 
considered during the reconstruction and therefore, the villagers’ social vulnerabilities 
were increased.  Through a case study of six villages in the Ranong and Phang Nga 
provinces, we identified some important social demographics that influenced specific 
changes in social vulnerabilities brought about by reconstruction approaches.  With this 
information relief organizations can better understand which social demographics and 
reconstruction approaches they must take into consideration to minimize changes in 
vulnerabilities during future reconstruction efforts.   
  3  
2 Background 
The reconstruction effort in Thailand following the tsunami successfully provided 
housing to the victims, but there is evidence that in some cases it increased their 
vulnerabilities (DeMasi et al., 2006).  This chapter will provide background information 
about the effect of the tsunami and the reconstruction following the tsunami.  An 
overview of the tsunami and its effects on the Thai people will be described in order to 
depict the level of devastation.  The chapter will also give some information about post-
disaster reconstruction practices in general.  Understanding recommended reconstruction 
practices allowed us to better assess the reconstruction that was performed in Thailand 
following the tsunami by giving us a means of comparison.  The chapter will then discuss 
issues relating to the reconstruction, including which organizations contributed.  We will 
also provide a detailed explanation of the concepts of vulnerability and social 
demographics.  To better facilitate our focus on housing reconstruction, only the Ranong 
and Phang Nga provinces were studied because they are primarily residential regions 
rather than tourist regions, such as the province of Phuket.   
2.1 Tsunami Damage Assessment 
 As a result of the tsunami, many lives were lost, entire villages were destroyed, 
houses and buildings were damaged, natural resources were lost, and livelihoods were 
destroyed.  This section will describe the damage the tsunami caused to the people, 
infrastructures, and environment of Thailand. 
2.1.1 The People 
The number of deaths and injuries in Thailand was the most devastating aspect of 
the tsunami.  As of one year after the tsunami, the death toll was into the thousands, 
totaling 8,212 – 8,327 persons, with 5,395 people confirmed dead and 2,817 people 
presumed dead (UNDP, 2005, Rigg, Law, Tan-Mullins, & Grundy-Warr, 2005, 
Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation [DDPM], 2006).  In addition to the 
number of deaths, there were a total of 8,457 people injured during the tsunami, many of 
whom were not able to get immediate care in adequate medical facilities.  These numbers 
are not 100% accurate because of the large number of unidentified bodies and the 
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probability that people died who were not known or looked for by loved ones.  The death 
toll declared by the government, however, does give a fairly accurate and gruesome idea 
of how much damage the tsunami has done (UNDP, 2005).   
In addition to the death toll, the lives of those who did survive the tsunami have 
been adversely affected.  Those who survived may have witnessed the death of loved 
ones, been rendered homeless, lost livelihoods, and lost independence by having to rely 
on others for a means of survival (UNDP, 2005).  According to the UNDP (2005), the 
number of people who lost a family member or home in Thailand reached 100,000.  
Further intensifying the psychological effects of the villagers’ losses, the death tolls also 
included religious and local leaders, which directly affected the lives of many villagers.  
With their leaders dead, these villages were unable to function as a community following 
the disaster because there was no one to provide leadership.  Children that survived the 
tsunami have also been greatly affected.  In Thailand, 1,449 children lost either one or 
both of their parents, making them orphans.  Many schools were destroyed or damaged to 
the extent that classes had to be halted for an extended period, causing the education of 
50,000 children to be disrupted (UNDP, 2005).  These statistics show just how far 
reaching and devastating the tsunami was to the people of Thailand. 
2.1.2 Village and Land Damage 
 Most of the southwest coast of Thailand was heavily damaged by the tsunami, 
including 6 provinces, 25 districts, 95 tambons (local governments, similar to a county), 
and 407 villages (UNDP, 2005, DDPM, 2006).  Of those villages that were damaged 47 
were either completely or mostly destroyed (UNDP, 2005).  The villages that were 
completely destroyed were the ones that had the most loss of life and the biggest 
disruptions to the livelihoods of the residents.  The provinces affected were: Krabi, Phang 
Nga, Phuket, Ranong, Satun, and Trang (Figure 1).  Phang Nga was the most devastated 
area, accounting for over two-thirds of the total deaths, 57% of the destroyed houses, and 
half the estimated value of total housing damage (UNDP, 2005).   
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(Pararas-Carayannis, 2005) 
 Official reports estimate that 3,302 homes were destroyed with an additional 
1,504 houses damaged (UNDP, 2005, DDPM, 2006).  The largest number of destroyed 
houses was in the province of Phang Nga, with 1,904 destroyed and 604 damaged, 
Phuket with 724 destroyed and 291 damaged,  Krabi with 396 destroyed and 262 
damaged, and Ranong with 224 destroyed and 111 damaged.  Satun and Trang, the two 
southern most provinces, saw minimal damage in comparison to that of the other four, as 
shown in Table 1 (UNDP, 2005, DDPM, 2006).   
Province Houses Destroyed Houses Damanged 
Phang Nga 1,904 604 
Phuket 724 291 
Krabi 396 262 
Ranong 224 111 
Table 1: Housing Damage By Province 
The DDPM (2006) reports that a total of 3,558 people put in requests for the 
construction of permanent houses.  Approximately $36 million USD was given by private 
organizations to assist in the reconstruction of permanent houses in Phang Nga, Krabi, 
Ranong, and Phuket, with $31 million USD in Phang Nga, $2 million USD in Krabi, $2 
million USD in Phuket, and less than $1 million USD in Ranong.  The government also 
 
Figure 1: Map of Affected Areas in Southern 
Thailand (areas affected are shown in yellow, 
unaffected areas are shown in green) 
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provided approximately $2 million USD to reconstruct 3,367 houses in all affected 
provinces (DDPM, 2006).  A summary of the damage caused by the tsunami can be seen 
in Table 2 below.   
In addition to the number of people killed and injured and buildings destroyed, the 
land and environment were also heavily damaged.  The impact of the wave caused 
hazardous materials and debris from the destruction of houses, vehicles, and other 
buildings to scatter across the affected areas.  There was also quite a bit of damage due to 
salt water intrusion on the mainland.  Fresh water supplies were contaminated with salt, 
preventing villagers and residents from drinking their usual water supplies.  Ground 
water has also been contaminated from the salt water, sewage, and waste seeping into it 
(UNDP, 2005).  Additionally, some of the land that was swept over by the tsunami is 
now contaminated with much higher levels of salt, and can no longer be used for any 
significant agricultural purposes (UNDP, 2005).   
2.2 Post Tsunami Reconstruction Effort in Thailand 
Due to the massive amount of damage caused by the tsunami, many NGOs and 
governmental organizations began relief efforts in an attempt to restore the affected 
villages.  Reconstruction following a disaster can refer to the construction of houses, 
resorts, hotels, or business offices, depending on the area affected.  In the context of this 
project, reconstruction will refer to the reconstruction of houses. 
2.2.1 Disaster Recovery – Phases and Rates of Recovery 
In the case of any disaster, the relief effort can begin after the damage from a 
disaster is assessed.  Major relief efforts can be broken down into three stages: 
Confirmed Deaths 5,395 people 
Uncomfirmed Deaths 2,817 people 
Number of Destroyed Houses 1,504 houses 
Amount of Money From Private Sector for 
Reconstruction 
$36 million USD 
Amount of Money From Government for 
Reconstruction 
$2 million USD 
Table 2: Summary of Tsunami Damage 
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emergency, restoration, and post-restoration, each with a specific role in the effort ().  
With these phases, necessities are provided first, followed by a more complex system to 
restore livelihoods. 
The emergency phase focuses on providing necessities – mainly housing, food 
and clothing – to those affected.  In this phase, relief organizations will provide things 
that are critical to survival, such as temporary shelters, medical treatment, food, and 
clothing (Kent, 1987, Hass, Kates, & Bowden, 1977).  In Thailand this phase consisted of 
tasks such as controlling the spread of disease, collecting and storing bodies, setting up 
temporary housing, and setting up centers for victim assistance (DDPM, 2006). 
The second phase, the restoration phase, focuses on restoring structures that have 
been damaged or destroyed.  This phase may consist of tasks varying from providing 
seeds and/or farming equipment to performing a large scale reconstruction of residences 
(Kent, 1987, Hass, Kates, & Bowden, 1977).  Following the emergency phase, relief 
organizations in Thailand began replacing boats for fishermen, providing farming 
equipment, and reconstructing the houses of villagers (DDPM, 2006). 
Following the restoration phase is the post-restoration phase, which may also be 
called the replacement reconstruction period.  In theory, this last phase is meant to assess 
and minimize the vulnerabilities brought about by the emergency and restoration phases, 
which may include improvements to reconstructed houses, establishing a disaster escape 
plan, and pre-disaster planning (Kent, 1987, Hass, Kates, & Bowden, 1977).  The work of 
this project focuses on the post-restoration phase by evaluating the outcomes of the 
reconstruction. 
 
Figure 2: Phases of Disaster Relief 
Emergency 
Phase 
Disaster Occurs Restoration 
Phase 
Post-Restoration 
Phase 
Provides Basic 
Survival 
Requirements 
Reconstruction of 
Houses 
Restoration Phase is 
Evaluated.  
Construction 
Continues 
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2.2.2 Overview of Tsunami Response in Thailand 
Following the tsunami, the restoration phase focused on reconstructing damaged 
and destroyed houses.  Many countries around the world, such as the United States, 
offered relief to the tsunami-affected countries, including Thailand (Thamnoon 
Srivontna, personal communication, January 24, 2007).  Thailand’s former Prime 
Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, refused international aid, saying that other affected 
countries were in need of more help.  According to Thamnoon Srivontna (personal 
communication, January 24, 2007), many Thai citizens, especially those directly affected 
by the tsunami, were opposed to this decision because they felt that they were, in fact, 
much in need of help.  However, rather than accepting international aid, the Thai 
government performed a large portion of the reconstruction, with the King’s Foundation 
and Princess Sirindhorn’s Foundation donating the money required for the construction 
of the houses, while other governmental agencies, such as the Royal Thai Air Force and 
Military, performed the physical construction (Aacaan Absornsuda Siripong, personal 
communication, February 13, 2007).  The Ministry of Interior informed us that the 
Bureau of Architecture created the designs for the government-built houses (personal 
communication, January 8, 2007). 
2.2.3 Organizations Involved 
Despite the Prime Minister’s refusal to accept aid, many national and international 
NGOs reconstructed villages in the tsunami-affected provinces by establishing local 
contacts within the provincial government (Thamnoon Srivontna, personal 
communication, January 24, 2007).  Thus, there were no records kept in the central 
government of which organizations performed reconstruction and where they worked, 
although we were informed that select records may be found at the provincial level 
(Thamnoon Srivontna, personal communication, January 24, 2007).   
It is difficult to find all of the organizations that performed reconstruction, as well 
as which villages they reconstructed because of the lack of records that were kept.  We 
have compiled a limited list of some NGOs that performed reconstruction in Thailand, 
the villages they reconstructed, the dates of work, and the number of houses built, which 
we obtained from D-TRAC – a private organization based in Thailand that provides 
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information about the tsunami and the reconstruction effort (Disaster Tracking Recovery 
Assistance Center [D-TRAC], 2006).  We have also compiled information regarding the 
villages that were reconstructed by the Thai government from a report by the Federation 
of Southern Fisherfolk, Save Andaman Network, and Sustainable Development 
Foundation (2006).  The list that we have compiled can be found in a table in Appendix E 
and can also be viewed in a more organized manner in the database we have created, 
which we will discuss in more detail in our methods section.   
The list we have created is incomplete because we found no central documents of 
all the organizations that performed reconstruction in Thailand, as discussed in the 
previous section.  Also, some items are referred to as “unknown,” meaning that we were 
unable to gather this information from the resources available to us.  We believe that 
there may be additional resources and records found in the provincial offices that we 
were unable to obtain. 
As can be seen in Appendix E, many of the NGOs that performed reconstruction 
are organizations from Thailand, such as Save Andaman, the Rotary Club of Patong 
Beach, and the Phuket Tsunami Recovery Fund.  Additionally, some international NGOs 
performed reconstruction, such as Habitat for Humanity, the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation, and World Vision.  Some organizations, such as Save 
Andaman, Habitat for Humanity, Community Organizations Development Institute, and 
the Thai government reconstructed villages in the four provinces that incurred the most 
damage (Phang Nga, Ranong, Phuket, and Krabi), while other organizations, such as 
Loung Marc, the Phuket Tsunami Recovery Fund, and the Social Pastoral Center 
reconstructed villages in only one province.   
2.2.4 Reconstruction in Ban Tub Nua and Ban Hat Sai Khao 
Although it has been difficult to gather information regarding the details of the 
reconstruction effort, there has been a study performed by DeMasi et al. (2006) to 
understand the effects of the reconstruction effort by the Thai government in the villages 
of Ban Tub Nua and Ban Hat Sai Khao of Ranong province.  They have found that in 
some cases, the reconstructed houses increased the vulnerabilities of the villagers, while 
in other cases the reconstruction promoted villagers’ livelihoods and therefore decreased 
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vulnerabilities.  (Vulnerabilities describe a society’s social or physical susceptibility to 
certain risks or hazards.  A complete discussion of vulnerability is provided in Section 
2.4.)  For example, Habitat for Humanity ensured that villagers were knowledgeable 
about the materials and construction techniques used so that they could repair and 
maintain their houses, thereby decreasing their social vulnerabilities (DeMasi et al., 
2006).  The findings from the two villages studied by DeMasi et al. (2006) will be 
explored and discussed in this section, but it is important to keep in mind that these 
findings only reflect the study of two villages. 
 The primary finding of DeMasi et al. (2006) was that the reconstruction effort 
following the tsunami has left many village residents more socially and physically 
vulnerable than before the disaster.  The houses increased the villagers’ vulnerabilities to 
rain, wind, and sun.  The materials used in the reconstruction do not absorb rain, as the 
villagers’ old houses did, which has subsequently created flooding in villagers’ houses 
during storms.  These inadequacies caused the villagers to be more susceptible to 
everyday changes in the weather.  Additionally, the village layout in Ban Tub Nua and 
Ban Hat Sai Khao is now in rows, which raised concerns that increased wind speeds 
during storms would cause more destruction to the houses than their pre-tsunami houses 
(DeMasi et al., 2006). 
 Another important finding was that the residents of these two villages were not 
sufficiently included in the design and construction of the houses, and therefore do not 
fully understand how to care for the new structures.  The houses were built with materials 
that are unfamiliar to villagers, so they must rely on outside help to repair and maintain 
their homes.  Also, by using rapid visual assessment techniques, DeMasi et al. (2006) 
found that many villagers have made unsafe additions to their homes.  For example, 
many villagers had constructed only partially completed additions, which increases their 
vulnerabilities because these uncompleted walls do not bear loads properly.  Many 
villagers believed their additions were unsafe and could possibly be harmful because they 
had a lack of knowledge about construction techniques that would reduce vulnerabilities 
(DeMasi et al., 2006). 
 In summary, villagers are now less independent and must seek outside help to 
deal with the problems caused by the reconstruction.  Unfortunately, the villagers do not 
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seek outside help and often will try to fix the problems themselves, as reported by 
DeMasi et al (2006).  The local NGOs were supposed to provide village representatives 
that the villagers could contact for information or help with any problems associated with 
their new housing.  Unfortunately, none of the villagers interviewed knew the contact 
information for their village representative (DeMasi et al., 2006). 
 It is unknown whether these problems have occurred elsewhere in Thailand 
because there is a lack of information regarding the post-tsunami reconstruction in other 
villages.  It is also unclear how these problems may be related to the reconstruction 
practices used by the organizations.  However, the same problems have occurred during 
past reconstruction efforts after other natural disasters, suggesting that findings in these 
two villages may not be isolated incidents.  For example, the reconstructed houses that 
were built after an earthquake in India in 1993 were made of modernized materials that 
villagers were unfamiliar with.  In response to this, villagers rebuilt their homes using 
local materials and traditional techniques, increasing their vulnerabilities to a future 
earthquake (Boen & Jigyasu, 2005, Salazar, 2001).  These experiences suggest that often 
“disaster relief and recovery assistance fails to take into account the need to support 
livelihoods and future resistance to hazards by reducing vulnerability” (Adger, 2001, pg. 
5).  In the following section we will turn to some reconstruction approaches 
recommended by scholars to reduce future vulnerabilities. 
2.3 Practices to Consider in Reconstruction 
 As described previously, the post-restoration phase is when major reconstruction 
of housing and infrastructure takes place.  In this phase, there are many practices and 
procedures that scholars recommend for relief organizations in order to reduce the 
affected community’s vulnerabilities.  It is important to keep in mind that the practices 
presented in this section are based upon lessons learned from previous disasters and may 
not apply to all reconstruction situations.   
First, past experience provides evidence that all participating organizations should 
work together to organize, coordinate, and plan the reconstruction effort, considering the 
possible short term and long term effects of the reconstruction on the community (Walter, 
2005, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 1996).  
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Scholars suggest that the work be divided such that each organization focuses on one 
aspect of the community’s recovery and that their focus reflects each organization’s 
specialized skills, such as planning, construction, or interviews with the local people 
(Walter, 2005).  It is recommended that the information gathered be shared among all of 
the participating NGOs and governmental organizations (Walter, 2005).  Coordination 
between the organizations is best achieved by having a single coordinator, who can be a 
single person in the case of a small disaster, or a large group for a large disaster, to 
oversee all reconstruction activity, ensuring that everything is properly organized 
(Walter, 2005).   
 Scholars advise that organizations consider the opinions of the victims of a 
disaster and involve them in the reconstruction effort (Walter, 2005, ALNAP, 2005, 
OECD, 1996).  Past experience has shown that involving the community will help ensure 
that the housing provided adequately meets residents’ needs (ALNAP, 2005).  It seems 
obvious that organizations should involve the victims, but this practice is often 
overlooked because organizations rush to provide the community with housing to meet 
immediate survival needs (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989, Cannon, Rowell, & Twigg, 
2003).  For example, following an earthquake in Gediz, Turkey in March, 1970, the local 
community was not involved in the reconstruction effort.  Village residents were unhappy 
with the design of the new houses, village layout, and placement.  In this case, many 
villagers returned to the site of their old homes to rebuild their houses using the style of 
traditional houses (Mitchell, 1976).   
On the other hand, when villagers are involved in the reconstruction process they 
are generally pleased with the outcomes.  Following an earthquake in Joyabaj, Guatemala 
in 1976, ALIANZA (Alianza para el Desarrolo Integral de la Juventud), the organization 
heading the reconstruction effort established a program to train residents in the principles 
of earthquake-resistant housing.  Villagers were then able to reconstruct their own houses 
with materials provided by ALIANZA, by following the design of a demonstration house.  
ALIANZA, then, set up a system to inspect the houses to be sure that they met the 
appropriate requirements (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989).   
 Input from the affected people can be obtained through direct interviews or 
consultations, assessments, or information gathered from local leaders (Walter, 2005, 
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OECD, 1996).  It is suggested that this sort of input be gathered regularly throughout the 
reconstruction process to confirm that the people are satisfied or to learn why they are 
dissatisfied with the results (ALNAP, 2005, Walter, 2005).  Constant communication 
may help gain the local community’s trust of the organizations (ALNAP, 2005).   
Past experience has demonstrated that the best way for relief organizations to 
gather information about the local area and its people is to work with local groups and 
organizations (OECD, 1996).  Local groups and agencies can provide the best insight into 
the needs and wants of the local people and can also constantly assess and maintain 
contact with the community (OECD, 1996).  By involving the local community in the 
reconstruction, the idea is that they will feel a sense of ownership, empowerment, and 
will be pleased with the outcomes of the new houses (Walter, 2005).   
Scholars recommend that organizations use local resources and local labor when 
rebuilding houses, to ensure that the local people will be able to maintain and repair their 
houses in the future, preventing their dependency on outside agencies (ALNAP, 2005).  
Also, using local labor may boost the economy in the affected area and could speed the 
rate of recovery (ALNAP, 2005).  Following an earthquake in Maharashtra, India on 
September 30, 1993, the organizations leading the reconstruction created modernized 
houses using industrialized materials and did not consider the use of local materials 
because they felt this would prevent damage from future earthquakes.  Many villagers 
rebuilt their homes using traditional materials and building techniques, making them as 
vulnerable as they were before the earthquake (Boen & Jigyasu, 2005, Salazar, 2001).  
Finally, it is strongly suggested that organizations reduce the social and physical 
vulnerabilities of the community (ALNAP, 2005).  If the reconstruction does not reduce 
vulnerabilities inherent in the pre-disaster state, then it is not providing the community 
with a solution.  Reconstruction following a disaster should not be performed so quickly 
that the community is put in the same situation as (or a situation worse than) before the 
disaster (ALNAP, 2005, Walter, 2005).  Following the 2004 tsunami in India, 
reconstruction was begun so soon that “many groups undertook rapid assessments that 
overlooked some of the complexities of the communities they were assessing” (Walter, 
2005).  Obviously, the purpose of reconstruction should be to help the affected 
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community, both in the long term and the short term.  A summary of the reconstruction 
approaches described in this section can be found in Table 3. 
2.4 Vulnerability 
As discussed above, past experience has shown that the use of the described 
reconstruction approaches will help to reduce a disaster affected area’s vulnerabilities.  
DeMasi et al. (2006) have speculated that the reconstruction following the tsunami did 
not adequately take into consideration the physical and social vulnerabilities of the 
villagers, as described in Section 2.2.4.  To better understand the effects of the 
reconstruction on the villages, this section will explain the concept of vulnerability, 
focusing particularly on its attributes, categories, and scales. 
Vulnerability as understood by Cannon, et al. (2003), is “a way of conceptualizing 
what may happen to an identifiable population under conditions of particular risks and 
hazards” (p. 4).  The analysis of vulnerability is used as a tool to predict the physical and 
social effects of a future hazard or the impacts of a past event (Adger, 2001).  
Vulnerability can be broken up into two main categories, physical and social (Cannon et 
al., 2003, Adger, 2001).  Vulnerability may also be related to different scales, including 
individual and collective (Cannon et al., 2003, Adger, 2001).  All vulnerabilities, 
regardless of category or scale, can be described by three attributes – exposure, 
sensitivity, and resilience (Turner, et al., 2003, Kasperson, J.X., Kasperson, R.E., Turner, 
Hsieh, & Schiller, 2003).   
Reconstruction Approaches Recommended by 
Scholars 
Coordination of relief effort between 
organizations 
Communication with villagers at all stages 
Involvement of disaster victims (during planning, 
construction, and after construction) 
Use of local resource and labor 
Consideration of vulnerability reduction 
Table 3: Recommended Reconstruction Practices 
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The three attributes – exposure, sensitivity, and resilience – determine the degree 
of vulnerability.  Exposure focuses on the studied society’s amount of contact with 
possible hazards that could lead to disaster.  For example, a group of people may be 
located along the beach and therefore may be exposed to tsunami.  The degree of 
exposure in the area depends on the frequency, magnitude, and duration of the hazard.  
Sensitivity is the susceptibility of a society to a potential hazard – a hazard will cause 
more damage or stress to a society with a higher sensitivity.  The level of sensitivity may 
be decreased by taking certain measures to reduce vulnerabilities, such as resilient 
construction for a tsunami, or improving education about tsunami evacuation procedures.  
Resilience describes a group’s or individual’s ability to recover from a disaster.  A 
resilient community will be able to cope with the effects of the disaster, which can be 
done in a variety of ways, such as implementing new programs or policies to restore the 
community to a normal state (Turner, et al., 2003, Kasperson, J.X., et al. 2003). 
With these attributes in mind, vulnerabilities may be categorized as either 
physical or social.  In the physical sense, it is “the likelihood of buildings to collapse or 
infrastructures to be damaged” (Cannon et al., 2003, p. 5).  Social vulnerability is “a 
limited capacity to cope and recover from stresses and shocks on assets, activities and 
capabilities related to survival and development (Thailand Burma Border Consortium, 
2004, p. 10), where stress is described as “a disruption to groups or individuals’ 
livelihoods” (Adger, 2001, p. 5).   
Both physical and social vulnerabilities can be further characterized by two broad 
scales – collective or individual, as shown in Figure 3.  A collective vulnerability 
describes a vulnerability that a group of people may face, while an individual 
vulnerability describes a vulnerability that a single person may face.  Collective 
vulnerability is assessed by the presence of social institutions within the community that 
establish preparedness, precautions, and social protection, such as disaster mitigation or 
shelters.  Individual vulnerability is determined by such things as individual social status, 
income, diversity of income sources, protection afforded by the individual’s home, and 
physical health.  Although these two types of vulnerability are distinctly different, they 
are interrelated in that collective vulnerability affects individual vulnerability and vice 
versa (Cannon et al., 2003, Adger, 2001).  For example, if a community is vulnerable to a 
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natural disaster because they lack disaster mitigation and preparedness plans, it is very 
likely that individuals’ homes are physically vulnerable to the disaster because they may 
lack knowledge about disaster resistant construction.   
 
In the villages of Ban Tub Nua and Ban Hat Sai Khao, the relationships described 
here about the attributes, categories, and scales of vulnerability apply.  Considering how 
much damage the Ranong province incurred from the tsunami, it is obvious that there 
was much physical vulnerability present.  The reconstruction effort has brought social 
vulnerabilities, such as an increased dependency on outside agencies to maintain their 
new houses (DeMasi et al., 2006), as discussed in Section 2.2.4.  There is a high level of 
exposure to tsunamis in these two villages and therefore a high vulnerability because they 
are less than one mile from the coast (DeMasi et al., 2006).  The level of sensitivity in 
these villages was also high because of the poor quality of construction of the pre-
tsunami houses and lack of preparedness of the villagers (DeMasi et al., 2006), as 
discussed in Section 2.2.4.  Also, the communities affected were not very resilient 
because they were unable to cope with the effects of the tsunami (DeMasi, et al., 2006). 
2.5 Social Demographics 
As described in the previous section, the vulnerability of a community is 
determined by its exposure, sensitivity, and resilience to a hazard.  These factors of 
 
Figure 3: Relationships between Categories and Dimensions of Vulnerability 
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vulnerability are affected by social demographics – the social or cultural attributes that 
define the region or people (Dynes, De Marchi, & Pelanda, 1987).   
“The degree of vulnerability of a social system to a natural disaster is determined 
by the interaction of the physical properties of a disaster agent and the cultural, social, 
and psychological factors characteristic of the population occupying the specific 
location” (Dynes et al., 1987, p. 31). 
No universal set of factors can define the social demographics that affect 
vulnerability, but there is a general consensus in the social science community about what 
demographic factors influence vulnerability.  Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley (2003) have 
compiled a list, from a variety of sources, of social demographics that may influence 
social vulnerability.  These social demographics can be classified into the following 
categories: social, physical, economic, and cultural, where social describes an attribute of 
the society or interactions between people, physical describes the infrastructure of the 
area, economic describes the degree of wealth or economy of the region, and cultural 
describes the beliefs and customs of the people, as seen in Figure 4.  These classifications 
of the demographics can be seen in Figure 4.  All of the social demographics listed below 
will play a role in affecting a community’s social and/or physical vulnerabilities. 
2.6 Summary 
 Vulnerabilities are factors that increase a community’s susceptibility to hazards.  
The devastation caused by the 2004 tsunami resulted in part from the affected villages’ 
vulnerabilities.  Following the tsunami, a reconstruction effort was begun to restore the 
area to its original state.  DeMasi et al. (2006) have studied the reconstruction effort in 
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Figure 4: Social Demographics and Their Classifications 
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the villages of Ban Tub Nua and Ban Hat Sai Khao in the Ranong province.  They have 
found that in these villages, which were rebuilt by the Thai government, some of the 
villagers’ vulnerabilities were increased after the tsunami and reconstruction effort.  For 
instance, the reconstructed houses caused villagers to depend on outside help to maintain 
their houses.  The houses made villagers more susceptible to everyday changes in 
weather, such as wind, rain, and sun.  Also, villagers had begun adding unsafe additions 
to their houses, which further increased their vulnerabilities.  
 The vulnerabilities seen in Ban Tub Nua and Ban Hat Sai Khao may have been 
prevented if recommended reconstruction practices had been used.  If organizations had 
used local labor and resources, villagers may have obtained the abilities to maintain their 
new houses.  Villagers may have learned how to build safer additions to the houses if 
they had been taught about proper construction techniques.  Many of these problems are a 
result of a lack of communication with the villagers throughout the reconstruction 
process.  Also, villagers would have been less susceptible to sun, wind, rain, if 
organizations had more thoroughly considered reducing vulnerabilities in the villages.   
 In order to identify how the changes in vulnerabilities came about, these changes 
must be thoroughly studied, along with the reconstruction approaches used.  Relating 
these changes in vulnerabilities to the reconstruction approaches used in each village, will 
provide a better understanding of exactly how the reconstruction approaches affected the 
changes in vulnerabilities of the villagers.  Also, it is important to identify the social 
demographics of the villages that may have mediated these changes.  The following 
chapter will explain the methodology we used to gather information about these issues. 
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3 Methods 
In order to accomplish our goals of relating the reconstruction approaches used by 
organizations to the changes in social vulnerabilities villagers are experiencing and 
identifying the important social demographics that mediated changes in social 
vulnerabilities, we investigated the following research questions:  
• What processes did the organizations use to plan and implement reconstruction in 
the Ranong and Phang Nga provinces? 
• What changes to the villagers’ social vulnerabilities occurred after the tsunami? 
• How are the changes in social vulnerabilities related to the reconstruction 
approaches uses by the organizations? 
In order to answer our research questions, we performed case studies of six 
villages in the Phang Nga and Ranong provinces to gain an in-depth view of the 
reconstruction effort.  Also, we performed additional interviews and archival research to 
supplement our findings from the case studies, thereby gaining a broader view of the 
reconstruction.  We used semi-structured interviews with the directors of the relief 
organizations to determine the processes and approaches used in the villages to plan and 
implement the reconstruction.  We used semi-structured interviews with villagers and 
surveys to understand the changes in social vulnerabilities that villagers now face.  In 
order to systematically organize this information for our analysis, we compiled our data 
into a database, constructed using Microsoft Access 2003.  Once this information was 
gathered and organized, we were able to relate the reconstruction approaches used to the 
changes in social vulnerabilities and to infer the social demographics that may have 
mediated changes in social vulnerabilities brought about by the reconstruction effort.  
From these findings, we were able to recommend reconstruction processes that 
organizations should use as well as the types of social demographics that may be 
important for organizations to consider.  The process by which we gathered and used our 
data can be seen in Figure 5. 
  20  
 
 
In the following sections we will discuss the research methods that we used to 
answer each research question.   
3.1 Case Studies 
We were able to answer our research questions by performing field work in Ban 
Pak Triam, Ban Tarnkirin, Ban Chai Pattana, Chumchon Tap-parat, Ban Tub Nua, and 
Ban Talay Nok, which are all located in the Ranong and Phang Nga provinces.  We were 
able to gain access to these villages through our contact with Chris Dunbar of USAID, 
Bodhi Garrett of North Andaman Tsunami Relief (NATR), and our sponsor, Aacaan 
Absornsuda.  In addition to the case studies of these selected villages, we have performed 
additional archival research and interviews to learn about the reconstruction in other 
tsunami-affected villages.  A brief description of each village will be presented in this 
section, followed by a summary of this information in Table 4. 
Determine changes 
in social 
vulnerabilities 
 
Relate changes in 
social 
vulnerabilities to 
reconstruction  
approaches 
Determine 
reconstruction 
approaches 
Recommend reconstruction 
approaches for 
organizations to consider 
Figure 5: Summary of Method Objectives 
  21  
3.1.1 Ban Pak Triam 
The village of Pak Triam is located in the Khura sub-district of the Khuraburi 
district in the Phang Nga province.  It is a predominantly Muslim and fishing village, 
which was reconstructed by the Rotary Club of Patong Beach.  The village contains 23 
reconstructed houses.  Prior to the tsunami, the village was located on Nang Dam Island 
and was relocated to the mainland because the village was completely destroyed and 
there was fear that this might happen again in the event of a future tsunami.  In Ban Pak 
Triam, we interviewed the head of the village and briefly spoke to three additional 
villagers.    
3.1.2 Ban Tarnkirin 
Ban Tarnkirin is a Buddhist, fishing village, located in the Khuraburi district of 
the Phang Nga province.  The village consists of 20 families from village #4 on Patong 
Island that were relocated by the government because there was a general consensus that 
the island was not safe in the case of a future tsunami.  (Villagers and heads of the 
villages with whom we spoke referred to the villages on Patong Island by number, rather 
than by village name.)  Village #4 contained 120 villagers, 49 of whom died during the 
tsunami.  The remaining members of village #4 were relocated to another village, Ban 
Chai Pattana in the same district and province as Ban Tarnkirin.  Ban Tarnkirin was 
reconstructed by the Secours Populaire Française (SPF).  We were able to interview the 
head of the village in Ban Tarnkirin. 
3.1.3 Ban Chai Pattana 
Ban Chai Pattana is a fishing village with both Buddhists and Moken people 
containing 130 houses.  It contains villagers relocated from villages #2 and #4 on Patong 
Island.  It is located in the Khuraburi district of the Phang Nga district.  The money for 
the reconstructed houses was donated by Princess Sirindhorn’s Foundation as well as the 
King’s Foundation, while physical construction was done by the Royal Thai Air Force, 
along with volunteers from the Ratburri province.  In Ban Chai Pattana, we interviewed 
the head of the village, along with two other villagers.   
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3.1.4 Chum Chon Tap-Parat 
Chum Chon Tap-Parat is a Buddhist and Moken village, located in the Khuraburi 
district of the Phang Nga province.  It consists of 42 houses relocated from village #2 on 
Patong Island.  Only six villagers from the original village were killed by the tsunami.  
The village was reconstructed by the Catholic Mission of Surat Thani, while the funding 
for the houses was donated by Caritas International.  We interviewed two villagers from 
Chum Chon Tap-Parat 
3.1.5 Ban Tub Nua 
Ban Tub Nua is located on Prapat Beach in the Nai Wong Nua sub-district of the 
La Un district in the Ranong province.  It is a fishing village with 80% Muslims and 20% 
Buddhists that was physically reconstructed by the Royal Thai Air Force, with the 
funding obtained from the King’s Foundation and Princess Sirindhorn’s Foundation.  
This village contains 69 houses and was not relocated following the tsunami.  The 
tsunami killed 42 villagers in Ban Tub Nua.  In this village, we interviewed one villager.   
3.1.6 Ban Talay Nok 
Ban Talay Nok is a Muslim, fishing village located in the Suk Samran district in 
the Ranong province.  Twenty houses that were originally along the beach were moved 
uphill to the center of the village.  The houses had to be relocated because the villagers’ 
pre-tsunami houses were located on national park land, which was owned by the Thai 
government.  Ban Talay Nok was reconstructed by the Thai government.  In Ban Talay 
Nok, we interviewed one family, the head of the village, and handed out surveys to 15 
villagers.  
Village Reconstruction 
Organization 
Province Major 
Religion 
Major 
Occupation 
Relocated 
From? 
Number 
of Houses 
# of 
Villagers 
Interviewed 
Ban Pak Triam Rotary Club of 
Patong Beach 
Phang Nga Muslim Fishing Nang Dam 
Island 
23 4 
Ban Tarnkirin Secours Populaire 
Française 
Phang Nga Buddhist Fishing Patong 
Island 
(Village #4) 
Unknown 1 
Ban Chai Pattana Royal Thai Air 
Force, King’s 
Foundation, & 
Princess Foundation 
Phang Nga Buddhist Fishing Patong 
Island 
(Village #4 
& #2) 
130 3 
Chum Chon Tap-
Parat 
Surat Thani Phang Nga Buddhist Fishing Patong 
Island 
(Village #2) 
42 2 
Ban Tub Nua Royal Thai Air 
Force, King’s 
Foundation, & 
Princess Foundation 
Ranong Muslim Fishing N/A 69 1 
Ban Talay Nok Royal Thai Air 
Force, King’s 
Ranong Muslim Fishing Beach 20 2 
 (with 15 
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3.2 What processes did the organizations use to plan and 
implement reconstruction in the Ranong and Phang Nga 
provinces? 
In order to explore how the social vulnerabilities arose from the reconstruction 
effort, we needed to understand the processes used by organizations that brought about 
these vulnerabilities.  We needed to identify which organizations performed 
reconstruction in the Ranong and Phang Nga provinces.  We were able to specifically 
identify some organizations that performed reconstruction in Ranong and Phang Nga by 
utilizing the resources available on D-TRAC’s website, as described in Section 2.2.3.  In 
order to gather information about the reconstruction from different perspectives, we 
interviewed reconstruction organizations and villagers, where possible. 
3.2.1 Interviews with Organizations 
When interviewing reconstruction organizations we wanted to interview 
representatives of organizations from our case studies, as well as other organizations to 
understand the reconstruction at both in-depth and broad levels.  We were only able to 
interview one organization that performed reconstruction in our case study villages – the 
Bureau of Architecture in the Ministry of Interior’s Department of Public Works, who 
developed the designs for the houses built by the Thai government.  To gain a broader 
sense of the reconstruction, we also interviewed representatives from additional 
organizations – Habitat for Humanity and Save Andaman. 
For each interview, we used a semi-structured format, which allowed us to ask 
structured questions but also ask other questions based on the responses of the 
interviewees (Knight, 2002).  Therefore, we were not locked into a formal interview 
structure.  For each organization, we tried to interview the director of the organization or 
the administrator of the reconstruction effort, but when this was not possible we 
interviewed a representative who had been working at the organization at the time of the 
reconstruction effort.  Of course one person is not a sufficient sample size, but we felt 
that the director or administrator of the organization would know enough details about 
the reconstruction effort necessary for our purposes, and would also be well qualified to 
answer our interview questions.  We interviewed Osoth Golaving, the director of Habitat 
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for Humanity, Duangkamel (“Oy”) Sirisook, a representative from Save Andaman, and 
Suchart Trisatayapan, the director of the Bureau of Architecture.   
The interview questions we asked related to how the reconstruction was planned, 
organized, and performed.  Due to time constraints, we could not study all aspects of the 
reconstruction effort.  Therefore, we chose to focus on three processes that previous 
research has shown to be important for organizations to consider in order to reduce social 
vulnerabilities, as discussed in Section 2.3: 
• community involvement with design, 
• community involvement with construction, and 
• consideration of social demographics of the villagers. 
Community involvement with the design of the houses helps to ensure that the houses 
meet the community’s needs.  Community involvement in both the design and 
construction phases may better provide the affected people with the ability to maintain 
and repair their houses in the future, without depending on outside organizations.  
Another way to help ensure that the reconstructed houses will meet the needs of the 
community is for organizations to consider the unique social demographics of the village.  
The semi-structured interview questions we used focused around these three 
reconstruction approaches and may be seen in Appendix A. 
3.2.2 Interviews with Villagers 
Along with interviewing reconstruction organizations, we also wanted to 
understand the reconstruction from the perspective of the villagers.  In order to 
accomplish this, we used semi-structured interviews with villagers from each studied 
village and surveyed fifteen villagers in Ban Talay Nok, asking them questions about the 
processes described above.  The interview questions can be seen in Appendix B and the 
survey questions can be seen in Appendix C (a Thai-version may be seen in Appendix 
D).  The number of villagers interviewed from each village is described in Section 3.1 
and can be seen in Table 4.   
We used convenience sampling to choose villagers for the interviews and surveys.  
With convenience sampling we interviewed only those villagers available to participate 
(Knight, 2002).  Convenience sampling was used because we were not able to set up 
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interview times with individual villagers prior to visiting the villages.  Therefore, we 
went to the villages and interviewed villagers who were available to participate.  The 
exceptions to this were our interviews with the heads of villages, which were established 
prior to our village visits by our contacts Bodhi Garrett of NATR and Chris Dunbar of 
USAID. 
The questions asked were in the villagers’ native language – Thai – and therefore 
we needed to employ the use of a translator.  Our liaison, Aacaan Absornsuda Siripong, 
accompanied us on our trip to the villages to act as a translator.  As with any studies 
involving translations, some of our interview questions and responses could have been 
misunderstood, affecting the validity of our findings. 
Participants were not read consent forms because we felt that participation in our 
interviews and surveys was in no way dangerous to the villagers.  In order to maintain 
confidentiality, we will not disclose villagers’ names within our report.   
3.2.3 Analysis 
In order to analyze the data obtained from our interviews with villagers and 
representatives of reconstruction organizations we used coding methods established by 
grounded theory.  Grounded theory describes a set of procedures that allow a researcher 
to develop concepts and theories from qualitative data (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).  First, 
we developed concepts that described the data we gathered from our interviews.  
Concepts became more important if they were repeatedly present in more than one 
interview.  Then, we developed categories that described various concepts and grouped 
each concept into the appropriate category.  For example, one of our categories was 
“some organizations involved villagers in the reconstruction process,” where concepts 
such as “the Thai government did not involve villagers in the design of the houses” were 
grouped.  In order to ensure that concepts were grouped into the appropriate categories, 
constant comparisons were made between concepts to determine similarities and 
differences (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).   
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3.3 What changes to the villagers’ social vulnerabilities 
occurred after the tsunami? 
We needed to understand the changes to villagers’ social vulnerabilities to explore 
how these were brought about by the reconstruction effort.  To identify the changes in 
social vulnerabilities, we performed field work in the villages specified as case studies, 
using semi-structured interviews to gather the information we needed, as described 
previously.  Ideally we would have liked to use focus groups to gather more data from a 
wider sample, but given our time constraints, semi-structured interviews were the best 
option.   
In the studied villages we used convenience sampling because we were not able to 
establish interviews with villagers prior to our visits, as described above.  In order to 
choose individuals for our interviews, we asked villagers we saw if they were available to 
be interviewed.  The number of villagers interviewed in each village is described in 
Section 3.1 and can be seen in Table 4. 
The questions we asked villagers were in Thai, translated by our liaison, Aacaan 
Absornsuda Siripong.  The interview questions (found in Appendix B) allowed us to 
identify the social vulnerabilities that villagers experienced and were based on our 
hypotheses about social vulnerabilities that we expected to see in the villages – mainly 
social dependency and increased economic strain.  We hypothesized that villagers may 
have experienced an increase in social dependency and/or vulnerability to economic 
stresses due to the materials or construction techniques used by organizations. 
We used coding methods described by grounded theory to analyze the data we 
obtained from these interviews, as described in the previous section.  To analyze the data 
obtained from our surveys, we compiled survey results into a spreadsheet, totaling the 
number of responses for each survey question.  Then, we calculated the percentages of 
responses for each question. 
3.4 How are the changes in social vulnerabilities related to the 
reconstruction approaches used by the organizations? 
Understanding the connections between the changes in social vulnerabilities and 
the reconstruction approaches used by organizations required us to perform an analysis of 
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how the reconstruction approaches may have caused the changes in social vulnerabilities.  
From semi-structured interviews with relief organizations and villagers we learned which 
reconstruction approaches were used in the villages studied, as well as some additional 
villages.  Also, we learned what changes in social vulnerabilities the villagers are 
experiencing by performing semi-structured interviews with villagers.  In order to 
organize the information we gathered, we created a database capable of sorting village 
information in a way that allows reconstruction approaches in various villages to be 
easily viewed and compared. 
Our group was not able to gather data for every village affected by the tsunami, 
rather we set in place a system that contains some of this information and allows 
comparisons to be made.  The database contains the information we gathered from our 
interviews with organizations and villagers about the reconstruction approaches used.  It 
also contains information regarding additional villages and organizations that we have 
gathered from DTRAC (as described in Section 2.2.3).   
 Our database was created using Microsoft Access 2003.  Each village is 
represented by a village data-sheet that contains facts about the reconstruction (which 
organization reconstructed each village and what processes were used) and some 
statistics regarding the village, such as tsunami damage facts and village population.  
These village data-sheets are stored within the database and are available either by 
searching for reconstruction organization, village, or province.  The inner-workings of 
our database may be seen in Figure 6.   
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Once the database was populated with information from our data sources, we were 
able to identify common reconstruction approaches that were used by government 
agencies and NGOs.  We generated a list of the reconstruction approaches used by these 
organizations and a list of the changes in social vulnerabilities we observed.  These two 
lists were compiled independently of each other.  We needed to identify the specific 
reconstruction approaches that had caused each change in social vulnerability.  This was 
done by taking each of the observed changes in social vulnerabilities and matching them 
with a specific reconstruction approach.  We were able to match the changes in 
vulnerabilities to the reconstruction approaches by utilizing information gathered from 
our background research, such as knowing that a certain reconstruction approach may 
cause a certain change in vulnerability, and by comparing common themes throughout 
our data.  For example, if we noticed that two villages experienced a specific change in 
social vulnerabilities and also had the same reconstruction approaches we could draw the 
conclusion that these approaches may have caused the observed vulnerabilities.  In some 
cases, we identified reconstruction approaches that did not coincide with any of the 
changes in social vulnerabilities we observed or vice versa, meaning that our research 
was not conclusive.   
From our findings about the changes in social vulnerabilities, we were also able to 
infer the important types of social demographics that mediated changes in these 
 
Figure 6: Database Outline 
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vulnerabilities.  To do this, we extracted information regarding specific social 
demographics that influenced specific changes in vulnerabilities.  These social 
demographics were identified by asking villagers more probing questions.  For example, 
if they stated that they were dissatisfied with a particular aspect of their house, we would 
ask them why they were dissatisfied in order to understand if it had any relation to a 
social demographic. 
3.5 Summary 
By answering our research questions, we have gathered the information that we 
needed about the reconstruction effort to identify the important social demographics that 
mediated the changes in social vulnerabilities and also to form relationships between the 
changes in social vulnerabilities and the reconstruction approaches used by organizations.  
We performed semi-structured interviews with the relief organizations that performed 
reconstruction in order to understand the processes used.  We used semi-structured 
interviews with the villagers to identify the changes in social vulnerabilities that villagers 
are facing since the tsunami.  In order to organize the data we have gathered, we created a 
database containing village names, organizations that performed reconstruction, the 
reconstruction processes used, and information regarding the changes in social 
vulnerabilities.  By analyzing the data we have collected, we were able to establish 
relationships between the reconstruction approaches used and the changes in social 
vulnerabilities and to identify the important social demographics that may have mediated 
these changes. 
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4 Findings and Discussion 
This chapter will first present our findings in regards to the reconstruction 
approaches used by organizations, followed by findings regarding the changes in social 
vulnerabilities experienced by villagers.  The last section in this chapter will provide an 
analysis of the relationships between the reconstruction approaches and the changes in 
social vulnerabilities, explaining how these approaches are related to the changes in 
social vulnerabilities. 
4.1 Reconstruction Approaches Used by Organizations 
This section presents our findings about the approaches used by organizations to 
plan and implement the reconstruction. 
4.1.1 Finding #1: The involvement of villagers in the design and/or 
physical reconstruction of the houses varied by organization. 
We have found that some reconstruction organizations involved villagers in the 
design and/or physical reconstruction of the houses, while others did not.  The level of 
villager involvement varied depending on organization.  This section will describe the 
level of villager involvement used by each organization studied, as well as the process by 
which they involved villagers in the design and construction of the houses. 
Rotary Club of Patong Beach.  The village of Pak Triam was reconstructed by 
the Rotary Club of Patong Beach.  During our site visit, villagers explained that each 
villager designed and physically constructed his or her own house.  Villagers told us that 
the Rotary Club provided them with the materials needed for reconstruction, such as 
concrete, wooden beams, and thatching materials, from which they were able to choose 
the best materials for their houses.   The process, as described by villagers, was that the 
entire community, along with some volunteers, helped each other build the houses.  The 
result of the reconstruction is very different from other villages we have observed 
because each villager’s house is unique.  For example, some houses had an open ground 
floor, while others had enclosed ground floors and some had glass windows and concrete 
walls, while others were constructed with only wooden materials.  An example of a house 
in Ban Pak Triam can be seen in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: House Built by Rotary Club of Patong Beach in Ban Pak Triam 
Habitat for Humanity.  Osoth Golaving, the director of Habitat for Humanity, 
informed us that villagers participated both in the design and construction of their houses 
in the provinces of Ranong and Phang Nga (see Appendix E for complete details).  
Habitat for Humanity met with the home owners and community leaders to determine the 
design of the houses and the appropriate materials to use.  Villagers were able to choose 
between concrete or wooden materials.  Also, each villager was required to participate in 
the physical construction of his or her house for a minimum of 50 hours, as described by 
Osoth.  To ensure that this requirement was met, each villager agreed to a contract stating 
that they had to participate in the construction for 50 hours. 
Secours Populaire Française (SPF).  The village of Ban Tarnkirin, located in the 
Phang Nga province, was reconstructed by SPF.  The head of the village stated that he 
alone was allowed to help design the houses.  We were not able to gather any information 
about how much input the head of the village actually had in the design.  The villagers 
themselves were not involved in the physical construction of the houses.  The houses in 
Ban Tarnkirin are all one story, with an open patio, and an overhanging roof, as seen in 
Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Standard House Built by SPF in Ban Tarnkirin 
Catholic Mission of Surat Thani.  The Catholic Mission of Surat Thani 
reconstructed Chum Chon Tap-Parat, where the villagers stated that they (as a whole) 
were able to choose between two designs – a one story house or a two story house.  
Villagers were also able to choose the color of the paint for the houses.  Villagers 
mentioned that they helped move construction materials during the physical construction 
of the houses, but were not directly involved in the building of their houses.  The houses 
in Chum Chon Tap-Parat were simple, one story houses, as seen in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Standard House Built by the Catholic Mission of 
Surat Thani in Chum Chon Tap-Parat 
Thai Government.  The villages that we studied that were reconstructed by the 
Thai government were Ban Talay Nok, Ban Tub Nua, and Ban Chai Pattana.  All 
villagers interviewed in these villages, including the head of the village in Ban Chai 
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Pattana and Ban Talay Nok, said that they did not have any involvement in the design 
and construction of the houses.  They explained that the houses were built by the Royal 
Thai Air Force and then given to them.  Also, out of the 15 villagers surveyed in Ban 
Talay Nok, none of the villagers said they were involved in the design or construction of 
their houses.  On the other hand, Suchart Trisatayapan, head of the Bureau of 
Architecture in the Ministry of Interior, explained that after the tsunami, representatives 
went to the villages to ask villagers for input on the reconstructed houses.  He stated that 
three or four plans were made for the houses and villagers were able to choose between 
these plans.  He also explained that villagers were able to provide some input during the 
construction process in order to make small changes to the houses.  From our research, it 
seems as though the proposed processes did not actually occur in these villages.  This 
lack of consistency with our data is further explained in Finding #3 below, which 
discusses the lack of reconstruction coordination. 
The houses constructed by the Thai government (found in Figure 10 and Figure 
11) were two stories, with an open ground floor. 
 
Figure 10: Standard House Built by the Thai Government in Ban Chai Pattana 
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Figure 11: Standard House Built by the Thai 
Government in Ban Talay Nok 
Save Andaman.  Save Andaman worked in many villages in all six tsunami-
affected provinces (see Appendix E for complete details), involving villagers in both the 
design of the houses and the physical construction.  Duangkamel (“Oy”) Sirisook, a 
representative from Save Andaman, explained that Save Andaman organized community 
meetings in order to discuss the design of the houses.  Save Andaman would then 
negotiate the design and materials with the community, based on the budget for the 
project.  Oy told us that Save Andaman felt that it was important for villagers to be 
involved in the design of the houses to ensure that the houses met the community’s needs 
and to instill a sense of ownership within the community. 
4.1.2 Finding #2: Some villages were relocated due to land ownership 
and/or safety issues. 
Ban Chai Pattana, Ban Tarnkirin, Chum Chon Tap-Parat, Ban Talay Nok, and 
Ban Pak Triam were relocated either due to land ownership or safety issues.  Ban 
Tarnkirin, Ban Chai Pattana, and Chum Chon Tap-Parat were relocated from Patong 
Island to the mainland.  As explained by villagers, the decision to relocate these villages 
was made by the government, which felt that Patong Island was unsafe because the 
villages were located within the tsunami inundation zone.  For reasons described in 
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Finding #3, it is unclear what part of government was responsible for making this 
decision. 
Ban Pak Triam was also moved from an island (Nang Dam Island) to the 
mainland, although the reasons for this relocation are unknown.  The relocation may have 
been decided upon by the government or by villagers themselves.  Villagers in Ban Pak 
Triam did explain that they were able to choose the new location of their village based on 
a few choices, but it is unclear to us who presented them these choices. 
The situation in Ban Talay Nok was different than that of Ban Chai Pattana, Ban 
Tarnkirin, and Chumchon Tap-Parat.  Prior to the tsunami, the tsunami-affected villagers 
of Ban Talay Nok used to live along the beach, which is national park land owned by the 
government, while other villagers lived a few hundred meters inland.  The reconstructed 
houses could not be placed in the same location because it is illegal for residents to live 
on land owned by the government.  The head of the village in Ban Talay Nok explained 
that land within the main section of the village (a few hundred meters from the beach) 
was purchased by the Border Police and some villagers for the reconstruction of the 
destroyed houses. 
4.1.3 Finding #3: Throughout the reconstruction effort, there was little 
coordination among government agencies. 
Throughout our project, we have found that there was little coordination, if any, 
between the different government agencies involved in the reconstruction effort.  
Although we were not able to completely sort out the approaches used by the Thai 
government to plan and implement the reconstruction of the government-built houses, we 
have found that there were miscommunications between various government agencies.   
The Bureau of Architecture in the Ministry of Interior’s Department of Public 
Works was responsible for creating the designs for the houses.  According to Suchart 
Trisatayapan of the Bureau of Architecture, the designs were then passed on to the Royal 
Thai Air Force, Military, and other government agencies that performed the construction 
of the houses.  He said that about three or four designs were created, so that villagers 
could choose the design that they wanted. 
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When we interviewed the director of the Ranong provincial office, he explained 
that the Royal Thai Air Force chose the house designs.  It seems that there was some 
confusion between what the central government wanted and what actually happened at 
the provincial level. 
When we consulted villagers in our case study villages, it seemed as though the 
approaches described to us by government officials were not consistently followed by 
those performing the physical construction of the houses.  In all of the villages we studied 
that were rebuilt by the government, all of the villagers interviewed and surveyed told us 
that they had no choice in the design of their house, which is inconsistent with the 
processes Suchart Trisatayapan had described to us.  Also, he said that as the workers 
were building the houses, villagers could tell them to change small things about the 
houses.  However, all of the villagers surveyed said that they were not involved in the 
construction of the houses.  From the information we have gathered, it seems as though 
there is a disconnect between what some government officials say and what villagers say 
about the reconstruction. 
4.1.4 Finding #4:  There was little coordination between government 
agencies and NGOs. 
We have found that there was almost no coordination between the Thai 
government and NGOs.  As explained in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, the government did not 
work with NGOs during the reconstruction effort because they did not want to violate the 
former Prime Minister’s policies.  Despite the Prime Minister’s requests, many NGOs 
still performed reconstruction in tsunami-affected areas.   
As Suchart Trisatayapan of the Bureau of Architecture explained, the governor of 
each province decided which organizations would perform reconstruction in specific 
villages.  The lack of communication between the provincial offices and central 
government resulted in little, if any, record keeping for the reconstruction.  When we 
talked to the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) and Bureau of 
Architecture both in the Ministry of Interior, they both explained that records of which 
organizations worked in each village would be dispersed throughout the provincial 
offices, which they said may be hard to locate.  According to the DDPM, the central 
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government did not keep records of the organizations participating in the reconstruction 
effort because government officials did not want to violate the former Prime Minister’s 
policy of refusing aid. 
The director of the Bureau of Architecture, Suchart Trisatayapan, explained that 
NGOs could obtain the designs used for the government-built houses if they also wanted 
to follow these designs.  In order to do this, NGOs needed to contact the Bureau of 
Architecture and request the designs.  From what we have found, it appears that this was 
the only contact the central government had with any NGOs that performed 
reconstruction. 
4.1.5 Finding #5:  In some cases, government agencies and NGOs may 
have used unsafe materials or poor construction techniques. 
In our case study villages, we found that some of the houses may be unsafe or 
poorly constructed.  In Chum Chon Tap-Parat drop ceilings were used both for the inside 
of the houses and for the ceiling over the outdoor patio.  Due to high wind forces in the 
area, the tiles on the ceiling were already falling down, as seen in Figure 12, even though 
villagers had been living in the houses for only two weeks prior to our visit. 
 
Figure 12: Displaced Ceiling Tiles in Chum Chon Tap-Parat 
In Ban Tub Nua, the villager we interview showed us that the railing on the stairs 
was unstable because it could be easily moved with minimal force.  Also, he believes that 
the wood used for the stairs was not the best quality.  This villager also mentioned that 
the second story was unstable, which may be due to the fact that the floor was not 
reinforced with cross supporting beams as seen in Figure 13.  DeMasi et al. (2005) had 
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also noticed this problem in their study of Ban Tub Nua and Ban Hat Sai Khao in the 
Ranong province.  They found that the second story of the reconstructed houses was 
unstable due to a lack of cross-supporting beams. 
 
Figure 13: Non-Reinforced Second Story in Ban Tub Nua 
The head of the village interviewed in Ban Tarnkirin explained to us that many villagers’ 
houses had cracks and leaks in the walls and ceilings, which he believes were due to poor 
construction techniques. 
In the cases of the houses built by the Thai government, Suchart Trisatayapan told 
us that the roofs were built with asbestos.  Asbestos is a material made of asbestos fibers, 
which can cause an increased risk of lung cancer, cancer of the chest or abdominal cavity, 
or increased scarred tissue in the lungs.  Asbestos is only dangerous if the material is 
disturbed, by water damage, heavy air flow, hitting, rubbing, etc and then inhaled.  When 
disturbed asbestos fibers are released into the air, thus increasing the likelihood of the 
fibers being inhaled (Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2006).  Since the Ranong 
and Phang Nga provinces receive the most rain in Thailand, it seems very likely that 
asbestos fibers could be disturbed, which could cause health problems for these villagers. 
The Thai government did try to take into consideration the safety of the villages 
with a two story house design that was intended to be more tsunami resistant.  Suchart 
Trisatayapan from the Bureau of Architecture explained that the ground floor was left 
open with the hopes that water from a future tsunami would be able to flow under the 
house.  Whether or not the open ground floor will actually decrease damage in the event 
of a future tsunami is unknown.  When we asked the Department of Disaster Prevention 
and Mitigation if the two story design was meant to be more tsunami resistant they told 
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us that nothing the government could build would be tsunami resistant.  They also 
explained that the government’s focus was not on making structures tsunami resistant, 
but rather was on increasing the affected communities’ preparedness by installing 
warning towers and establishing appropriate evacuation routes and procedures. 
4.1.6 Finding #6:  In addition to rebuilding houses, some organizations 
have helped to restore villagers’ livelihoods. 
Some of the organizations that we studied, such as Save Andaman, helped to 
restore villagers’ livelihoods in addition to reconstructing houses.  Also, North Andaman 
Tsunami Relief Foundation (NATR) and USAID are two other organizations that did not 
perform reconstruction, but focused mainly on restoring livelihoods.  After the tsunami, 
Save Andaman worked with the Federation of Southern Fisherfolk to set up revolving 
funds within the local fishing communities.  The revolving fund provides fishermen with 
the money necessary to repair or rebuild their boats.  Fishermen would then replace this 
money so that it can be loaned out to others who are still in need of boats.  Besides 
occupational rehabilitation, Save Andaman also helped some communities settle land 
ownership disputes by providing them with lawyers that can negotiate these disputes for 
the villagers.  Most of the land disputes are between fishermen and the government, who 
mandate the coastline is national park land, or between fishermen and private parties, 
who claim they own the land along the coast. 
Similar to Save Andaman, other organizations, such as NATR and USAID, have 
helped to restore livelihoods.  NATR provides occupational rehabilitation to many 
fishermen in the Ranong and Phang Nga provinces by helping them salvage and repair 
boats.  They help communities set up eco-tourism systems, where villagers can produce 
handicrafts, such as hand made soaps, for tourists to buy.  NATR also provides education 
in English and computers for villagers at their education center in the Khuraburi district 
of Phang Nga. 
USAID helped to perform needs assessments directly after the tsunami.  
Following the immediate disaster relief, they have tried to help five villages in the 
Ranong province diversify their livelihoods, which they believe will help reduce the 
impact of the tsunami and possibly any future disasters.  They have led community based 
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training sessions to teach the community about alternative livelihoods.  They have trained 
many villagers about small business ownership and provided them loans through a 
revolving fund, similar to Save Andaman’s system.  According to Chris Dunbar of 
USAID, the development of new livelihoods will help these villagers recover from the 
effects of the tsunami by providing them with new means of income.   
We hypothesize that by restoring livelihoods, these organizations have helped 
alleviate increases in social vulnerabilities that were brought about by the reconstructed 
houses.  For example, we have found that in some cases relocation of villages has caused 
occupational shifts because many fishermen are now further from the ocean, as discussed 
below in Finding #9.  Organizations, such as USAID, NATR, and Save Andaman, may 
have helped decrease vulnerabilities due to occupational shifts by providing them with 
alternative livelihoods and repairing boats.  Since we were unable to fully explore the 
connections between livelihood restoration, reconstruction, and changes in social 
vulnerabilities, we will offer recommendations for researchers to explore this in the next 
chapter.   
4.2 Changes in Social Vulnerabilities Experienced by Villagers 
This section presents our findings in regards to the social vulnerabilities 
experienced by villagers in our case study villages. 
4.2.1 Finding #7:  Some villagers are unable to perform repairs and make 
modifications on their new houses, therefore increasing their 
dependency on others. 
Through our field work, we have found that many villagers are unable to perform 
necessary repairs and make modifications on their houses due to the differences in 
construction techniques and materials.  In many cases, the new houses are made of 
concrete and other materials that are foreign to villagers, whereas their old houses were 
made of wood.  Most of the villagers we interviewed do not know how to fix problems 
that may occur with their new houses or do not know where to obtain the appropriate 
materials, causing them to rely on outside labor, which increases their level of social 
vulnerability. 
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Some villagers stated that they had worked with concrete before, but most felt 
they did not have the knowledge to construct with concrete.  In Ban Talay Nok, which 
was reconstructed by the Thai government, the villager we interviewed did not know 
where to obtain concrete.  Also, he said that if he could purchase concrete, he would not 
know how to build with it.  He explained that most villagers could make simple repairs 
and additions, such as a thatched roof extension (which he himself built on his house), 
but could not build more complex things with concrete, such as a wall to enclose the 
ground floor (which he hired an outside agency to build for him).  A picture of this 
villagers’ house can be seen in Figure 14, where the thatched roof extends off the front of 
the house and the enclosed concrete wall can be seen on the right side of the house.  Of 
the villagers surveyed in Ban Talay Nok, 73% said they do have knowledge of the 
construction techniques and materials, but 71% said they were unable to obtain the 
materials necessary to modify and perform repairs on their houses. 
 
Figure 14: Additions on a House in Ban Talay Nok 
The head of the village in Ban Tarnkirin said that their houses were in need of 
repair because there were cracks in the walls and ceilings.  However, villagers do not 
know how to fix these problems themselves and do not have enough money to hire 
anyone to make repairs.  They have contacted the organization that performed 
reconstruction in this village (SPF), but it has not yet come to repair the houses. 
In most cases villagers stated that they were more self-sufficient before the 
tsunami and were able to perform repairs and maintenance on their houses.  Now 
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villagers’ social vulnerabilities have increased because they are more dependent on 
outside help and non-local resources. 
4.2.2 Finding #8:  Some reconstructed houses do not meet the specific 
needs and wants of the villagers.  Consequently, some villagers have 
made modifications to their homes. 
In our case studies in Ranong and Phang Nga, we found many cases of houses 
that simply did not meet some of the basic needs of the villagers.  Of the villages studied, 
the houses in Ban Chai Pattana, Ban Tub Nua, and Ban Talay Nok, were all two stories 
tall.  The villagers interviewed in Ban Chai Pattana stated that they would have preferred 
a one story house and those in Ban Talay Nok plainly stated they did not want two 
stories.  All of the villagers interviewed in Ban Chai Pattana and Ban Talay Nok 
mentioned that a two story house makes it difficult for the elderly to climb the stairs to 
the second floor.  It was not possible for elderly to live on the bottom floor of the 
standard house since it was not enclosed.  (Photos of the standard houses built by the 
Thai government can be seen in Figure 10 and Figure 11.) 
One family we interviewed in Ban Talay Nok built an addition to their house to 
enclose the first floor so elderly members of their household could sleep on the ground 
floor.  The addition consisted of a concrete wall and a thatched roof to provide additional 
shade and shelter from the elements, as shown in Figure 14 in the previous section. 
In comparison to the villages of Ban Chai Pattana, Ban Tub Nua, and Ban Talay 
Nok, which were all built by the Thai government, Ban Tarnkirin and Chum Chon Tap-
Parat contained one story houses. The head of the village in Ban Tarnkirin and the 
villager in Chum Chon Tap-Parat both stated that the villagers chose a one story house 
because they felt two story houses were a problem for the elderly. 
Another issue that many villagers interviewed in Ban Chai Pattana, Ban Tub Nua, 
and Ban Talay Nok mentioned was that the kitchens were built in the open ground floor, 
causing problems during the rainy season.  An open kitchen is a problem because, 
according to Aacaan Absornsuda Siripong, Ranong and northern Pang Nga have an eight 
month long rainy season, with the highest annual rainfall in Thailand.  Bodhi Garrett of 
NATR also explained that in some villages, the rain splashes off the roofs of houses into 
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the open floor of adjacent houses.  Although we were not able to verify this comment 
with our village visits, it appears that this could be a problem in our case study villages 
because the roofs of the houses are slanted at steep angles that, in some cases, were 
further extended by their owners, as seen in Figure 15. 
To address this problem, some villagers have enclosed the first floor.  The family 
that was interviewed in Ban Talay Nok explained that the open kitchen was another 
reason they added the addition to enclose the ground floor of the house (seen in Figure 
14). The head of the village interviewed in Ban Chai Pattana mentioned that in other 
cases, villagers may string up fabric and plastic tarpaulins between poles in the rainy 
season, as seen in the second story of the house in Figure 15 below.  Some villagers may 
also build additions out of traditional materials, such as the roof extension shown in 
Figure 14.  The villagers interviewed in Ban Talay Nok and Ban Chai Pattana both stated 
that in the old houses, the kitchens were inside. 
 
Figure 15: Tarpaulins on House in Ban Talay Nok 
In many of the houses reconstructed by the Thai government, there were also 
problems with the lot sizes of the houses limiting villagers’ ability to do subsistence farm 
or raise livestock.  Some families used to rely on subsistence farming, such as fruit trees 
in their yards, for additional income and/or food.  The villagers interviewed in Ban Talay 
Nok and Ban Tub Nua explained that they are no longer able to do this because they do 
not have enough land.  The family interviewed in Ban Talay Nok used to raise chicken 
and other small livestock to sell, but they are no longer able to do so due to space 
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constraints.  These villagers are now less self-sufficient because they must be more 
dependent on outside resources for fruits and vegetables, increasing their social 
vulnerabilities. 
Through surveys given to fifteen villagers in Ban Talay Nok, we have found that 
many of the villagers feel their houses aren’t large enough to meet their needs.  Twelve of 
the fifteen (80%) villagers felt that their new houses did not provide them with sufficient 
space for their family’s living needs, as seen in Figure 16.  Of the three villagers who felt 
that they had sufficient living space, two have made additions to their houses.  Also, 
eleven villagers (73%) said that their new houses were smaller than their old, while only 
four (27%) said they were about the same size.  These results show that many villagers in 
Ban Talay Nok do not feel their houses are large enough to suit their needs.  It is also 
important to note that seven of the fifteen villagers surveyed (47%) have made additions 
to their homes, although the reasons for the additions are unknown. 
Do you feel your house has sufficient space for 
your family's living needs?
12 (80%)
3 (20%)
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Yes
No
Number of Responses
 
Figure 16: Villagers' Perception of Sufficient Living Space in Ban Talay Nok 
4.2.3 Finding #9:  When villagers were relocated from coastal areas, they 
experienced changes in social vulnerabilities. 
Five of the six villages studied were relocated (Ban Tub Nua being the exception).  
Ban Tarnkirin, Ban Chai Pattana, and Chum Chon Tap-Parat were relocated from Patong 
Island to the mainland, Ban Pak Triam was relocated from Nang Dam Island to the 
mainland, and Ban Talay Nok was relocated from the beach towards center of the village. 
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Due to relocation some villages are now further from the sea, causing a disruption 
to their livelihoods and increasing their vulnerability to economic stress.  Each of the 
villages studied were fishing villages which were located very close to the water before 
the tsunami.  While this location made them extremely vulnerable to tsunamis it was 
ideal for fishing, which is the primary source of income for these villages.  In Ban 
Tarnkirin, Ban Chai Pattana, Chum Chon Tap-Parat, and Ban Pak Triam (all of which 
were relocated from an island to the mainland) villagers are between 300 meters to ! 
kilometer from their piers and in some cases, such as in Ban Chai Pattana, they must now 
travel to the pier on motorcycles.  Once they reach the piers they must travel a significant 
amount of time in their boats (villagers told us from 15 minutes to an hour) to get from 
the port to the open water where they can fish.  In Ban Tarnkirin and Chum Chon Tap-
Parat the interviewed villagers expressed concern that it is more difficult to fish since 
they must now travel farther to reach the open water. 
Since villagers are further from the sea they are not able to spend as much time 
fishing as they used to.  This problem is made even worse by the odd weather that has 
been occurring this year – some villagers told us that they are less likely to go fishing if 
the weather seems unpleasant.  Also, some villagers are not able to fish as frequently 
because they cannot travel to and from their ports through the canal during low tide.  
When we interviewed the head of the village of Ban Tarnkirin he stated that the income 
from fishing is now half of what it was when they lived on Patong Island.  This decrease 
in income has caused an increased economic strain on the residents because they are not 
able to make as much money fishing as they were prior to the tsunami.  This may 
increase their social dependency if they must rely on others for extra money or additional 
means of income. 
Although Ban Talay Nok was also relocated from a coastal area these villagers 
were only moved a few hundred meters from the coast to the center of the village.  
Villagers must now walk farther to reach the ocean than they did before the tsunami, but 
in comparison to other villages they do not have to travel through canals to reach the 
open water.  The villager interviewed in Ban Talay Nok said that he did not have any 
problems fishing in his new location. 
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In the villages that were relocated to the mainland from islands many villagers 
interviewed expressed concern that the cost of living is now higher, therefore increasing 
their vulnerabilities to economic strain.  Villagers in Ban Tarnkirin and Chum Chon Tap-
Parat mentioned that food is more expensive on the mainland.  The interviewed villagers 
in Chum Chon Tap-Parat said that they now have to travel to Kuraburi Market to buy 
food, where it is more expensive than on the island.  For some of the villages the market 
is also further away from their houses, which increases transportation costs.  
Additionally, the head of the village in Ban Tarnkirin explained that villagers are paying 
more for electrical bills and supplies to maintain their new houses. When this increased 
cost of living is coupled with the decreased income, which many villagers are now facing 
due to relocation, it is evident that there has been an increase in their social 
vulnerabilities. 
On the other hand, the relocation of villages has helped many villagers by 
providing them with land ownership.  In the case of Ban Talay Nok, prior to the tsunami 
the houses were located along the beach (a few kilometers from the center of town), 
which is national park land and is owned by the government.  According to Thai law it is 
illegal to build on national park land, leaving villagers vulnerable to eviction and losing 
their homes.  Unlike losing their houses from a natural disaster, if evicted from the land 
villagers would not necessarily get the assistance needed to rebuild their houses.  After 
the tsunami a piece of land located near the center of town was purchased and donated by 
the Border Police and a few of the villagers.  Once the houses were reconstructed each 
villager was given ownership of the land on which his or her house was constructed.  
Land ownership reduces villagers’ vulnerabilities by increasing their assets by providing 
them with a piece of land that cannot be taken away from them.  When the head of the 
village was interviewed he emphasized repeatedly that the villagers are very lucky to now 
own their land. 
Similarly, with Ban Pak Triam the village was moved from Nang Dam Island to 
the mainland.  A piece of land was purchased by the Rotary Club of Patong Beach and 
the ownership of the land was given to the community as a whole.  According to the 
villagers interviewed this system has worked very well for them. 
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One of the villagers interviewed Ban Chai Pattana told us that life on the island 
was very simple and life on the mainland may be more expensive, but she feels that it is 
better because it makes them more modernized.  All of the villagers interviewed from 
Ban Tarnkirin, Chum Chon Tap-Parat, and Ban Chai Pattana mentioned that they were 
grateful for the education system on the mainland.  According to those interviewed the 
schools on the mainland are much better than those on Patong Island.  Villagers in Ban 
Tarnkirin and Chum Chon Tap-Parat also explained that now schooling is free from 
kindergarten through primary school, which villagers are extremely thankful for.  The 
increased access to and higher quality of education may reduce the villagers’ social 
vulnerabilities in the future because it may provide younger generations with more 
occupational opportunities. 
Psychologically, many villagers feel safer now that they live further from the 
water. The villagers interviewed in Ban Tarnkirin, Ban Chai Pattana, and Chum Chon 
Tap-Parat all stated that most villagers did not want to go back to Patong Island because 
they are afraid of a future tsunami.  The villager interviewed in Ban Talay Nok stated that 
most villagers are afraid to go down the beach.  Most of the villagers interviewed in Ban 
Pak Triam felt that they were much safer now that they are living on the mainland.  The 
relocation has eased most villagers’ minds by moving them away from the ocean and 
away from the threat of a future tsunami. 
4.2.4 Finding #10:  Some villagers do not trust the structural integrity of 
their houses. 
Some villagers expressed concern regarding the structural integrity of their 
houses.  The villager we interviewed in Ban Tub Nua stated that one of the reasons he 
does not go upstairs is because he does not trust the stability of the stairs and the railing.  
He demonstrated how unstable the railing was by moving it back and forth.  This villager 
stated that he believed the quality of the wood used was not very good and he didn’t trust 
it.  In Ban Tarnkirin, the head of the village stated that many of the houses have 
developed cracks in the ceilings and walls, which has caused concern among some of the 
residents. 
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4.3 Analysis of the Relationships between Reconstruction 
Approaches and Changes in Villagers’ Social 
Vulnerabilities 
This section describes our analysis of the relationships between the reconstruction 
approaches used by the organizations and the changes in villagers’ social vulnerabilities.  
This section explains how the changes in social vulnerabilities were brought about by the 
reconstruction approaches. 
4.3.1 Finding #11: When villagers were not involved in the reconstruction 
process, most villagers became more dependent on others for house 
modifications and repair. 
In our analysis we found that when villagers were not involved in the 
reconstruction process, as described in Finding #1, the houses were often built using 
construction techniques and materials that villagers were unfamiliar with.  This means 
that they were more likely to be unable to perform repairs and make modifications on 
their houses, as described in Finding #7.  In all of the six villages we visited, we noticed a 
trend between the level of villager involvement in the reconstruction and the villagers’ 
abilities to perform the proper repairs on their houses.  When villagers participated in the 
reconstruction we found that they were knowledgeable about the materials and 
construction techniques used, whereas when they did not participate that were much less 
knowledgeable. 
For example, in Ban Tarnkirin, which was physically constructed without the help 
of the villagers, the head of the village stated that their houses were in need of repair due 
to poor construction.  The houses had cracks and leaks in the ceilings and walls, but they 
do not know how to fix these problems themselves. The villagers in Tarnkirin have also 
tried to contact the reconstruction agency (SPF), but it has not yet come to make the 
repairs on the houses.  These villagers must now rely on outside help to make necessary 
repairs on their houses, thus increasing their social dependency. 
As described previously, the villager interviewed in Ban Talay Nok, which was 
reconstructed by the Thai government, did not know where to purchase concrete or how 
to construct with it.  Also, 71% of villagers surveyed in Ban Talay Nok do not know 
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where to obtain the necessary materials to perform repairs.  Congruent with our findings, 
villagers in Ban Talay Nok were not involved in the reconstruction effort. 
In comparison, the villagers of Ban Pak Triam, who were able to individually 
design and construct their own houses, as described in Finding #1, are able to maintain 
and repair their houses.  This practice ensures that they are knowledgeable about the 
materials and construction techniques used.  Therefore, villagers of Ban Pak Triam are 
much less vulnerable to social dependency when compared to the other studied villages 
because they are able to repair and maintain their houses, without relying on outside help.  
A summary of villager involvement in the reconstruction effort and villagers’ ability to 
make necessary repairs and modifications can be seen in Table 5. 
4.3.2 Finding #12: When villagers were not involved in the reconstruction 
process, many villagers felt that their houses did not suit their needs 
and wants. 
Our analysis shows that when villagers were not consulted about the design and 
layout of the houses, as described in Finding #1, the houses did not meet villagers’ needs 
and wants, as described in Finding #8.  In Ban Chai Pattana, Ban Talay Nok, and Ban 
Tub Nua, all of which were reconstructed by the Thai government, two story houses with 
open kitchens were constructed.  This design caused problems during the rainy season 
and for elderly members of the community, as described in Finding #8.  All of the 
villagers interviewed in both Ban Chai Pattana and Ban Talay Nok mentioned that two 
story houses were a problem for the elderly and that they would have preferred a one 
story house. 
Village Villager Involvement 
Ability to Make Repairs and 
Modifications 
Ban Pak Triam 
HIGH – villagers designed and built 
their own houses 
HIGH – Can fix most problems that occur 
and make any needed modifications 
Ban Tarnkirin 
SOME – Head of the village participated 
in design process, villagers did not help 
in physical construction 
LOW – Do not know how to fix problems 
Ban Talay Nok 
NONE LOW – Can perform repairs with simple 
materials, but cannot use more complex 
materials and do not know where to obtain 
materials 
Table 5: Summary of Villager Involvement and Villager Ability to Perform Repairs 
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In contrast, the houses in Ban Tarnkirin and Chum Chon Tap-Parat were one 
story.  In Ban Tarnkirin, the head of the village was able to give his input for the design 
of the houses.  He stated that the villagers wanted a one story house because it was easier 
for elderly members of the village to move about.  In the village of Chum Chon Tap-
Parat, the villagers were given a choice between a one or two story house and they 
collectively chose the one story design because it was easier for the elderly to live in.  In 
both of these cases, villagers were able to provide limited input for the design of the 
houses and thus the houses were better suited for the villagers’ needs and wants.  A 
summary of how well the needs and wants of the villagers were met by different levels of 
villager involvement can be seen in Table 6.  As can be seen in the table there is a linear 
relationship between columns two and three, where the greater the level of villager 
involvement, the better villagers’ needs and wants were met.  On the other hand, there is 
an inversely linear relationship between columns two and four.  As the level of villager 
involvement increased, villagers made fewer modifications because the houses better 
suited their needs. 
Village Villager Involvement Were Needs/Wants Met? 
Modifications Made As a 
Result? 
Ban Chai Pattana 
NONE NO – Two stories and open 
ground floor caused problems 
YES – Plastic Tarpaulins to 
prevent rain from entering 
ground floor 
Ban Talay Nok 
NONE NO – Two stories and open 
ground floor caused problems 
YES – Thatched roof 
extension, concrete wall to 
enclose ground floor 
Ban Tarnkirin 
SOME – Head of the 
village gave input for the 
design 
YES – One story house is better 
for the elderly 
NO 
Chum Chon Tap-
Parat 
LOW – Chose between 
one and two story design 
and paint color 
YES – One story house is better 
for the elderly 
NO 
Table 6: Summary of How Well Villager' Needs and Wants Were Met Through Villager Involvement 
4.3.3 Finding #13: When villagers were relocated due to land ownership or 
safety issues, they experienced changes in social vulnerabilities. 
As was stated in Finding #2, there were safety and land ownership issues that 
forced reconstruction organizations and government agencies to relocate some villages.  
However, many of these villagers are now experiencing changes in social vulnerabilities 
as a result.  The most drastic changes in social vulnerabilities have occurred in the 
villages that have been relocated from an island to the mainland, as described in Finding 
  51  
#9.  These villagers are now further from the sea forcing them to travel longer distances 
to reach the open water where they can fish.  Villagers are not able to fish as frequently 
as before, which has caused their incomes to decrease.  Therefore, there has been an 
increase in villagers’ vulnerability to loss of their livelihoods due to increased economic 
strain. 
Also, the cost of living for many villagers has increased for many reasons, as 
described in Finding #9.  With an increase in the cost of living and the decrease in 
income, many villagers are facing new economic strains as a direct result of the 
relocation. 
As described in Finding #9, some aspects of the relocation have resulted in 
decreases in social vulnerabilities.  In some cases villagers now own their own land, 
eliminating their vulnerability to eviction.  Some villagers also expressed the feeling that 
the new location has made them more modernized, mainly because they feel the 
education system is better. 
A summary of the changes in vulnerabilities that were brought about by village 
relocation can be seen in Table 7.  As shown in the table, three out of the four villages 
that were relocated from islands to the mainland (Ban Chai Pattana, Chum Chon Tap-
Parat, and Ban Tarnkirin) experienced occupational stresses and an increased economic 
strain.  Also, two of the relocated villages (Ban Pak Triam and Ban Talay Nok) acquired 
land ownership as a result of the relocation. 
Village Relocated from Relocated to 
Occupational 
Stresses? 
Increased 
Economic 
Strain? 
Land 
Ownership? 
Ban Chai Pattana Patong Island Mainland YES YES NO 
Chum Chon Tap-
Parat 
Patong Island Mainland YES YES NO 
Ban Tarnkirin Patong Island Mainland YES YES NO 
Ban Pak Triam Nang Dam Island Mainland NO NO YES 
Ban Talay Nok Beach Center of village NO NO YES 
Table 7: Summary of Village Relocations and Resulting Changes in Vulnerabilities 
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4.3.4 Finding #14: We identified occupation, income, and family structure 
as being important social demographics that influenced changes in 
social vulnerabilities brought about by the reconstruction effort. 
The changes in social vulnerabilities that were caused by the reconstruction 
approaches used were dependent on the specific social demographics of the people.  
These specific social demographics are: occupation, income, and family structure. 
The first social demographic we identified that influenced the changes in social 
vulnerabilities is occupation.  As shown in Finding #9, when villagers were relocated 
from an island to the mainland, they experienced changes in vulnerabilities due to their 
occupations.  Since they were unable to fish as frequently as they could on the island, 
they had an increased vulnerability to economic stresses and an increased vulnerability to 
loss of livelihoods.  If an alternative location was chosen, such as one that was more 
accessible to the sea, villagers may have not experienced these increases in 
vulnerabilities.  These changes in vulnerabilities were a direct result of the location that 
was chosen and the ways that villagers had to interact with the new location in 
accordance to their occupation.  On the other hand, if these villagers had an occupation 
that did not rely on their proximity to the sea, this location would not have caused these 
particular changes in vulnerabilities, but would have caused different changes in 
vulnerabilities.  Thus, villagers’ occupations as fishermen have influenced the specific 
changes in social vulnerabilities, noted above, that were brought about by the 
reconstruction effort. 
The next social demographic that we identified that has influenced changes in 
social vulnerabilities was income.  As described in Finding #7, some villagers were 
unable to purchase the necessary materials to repair their houses because they did not 
have enough money to do so, therefore increasing their vulnerabilities to dependency.  
Organizations’ selection of materials may not have been appropriate because villagers’ 
incomes do not allow them to purchase the proper materials to maintain their houses.  In 
other cases, relocation of villages has caused an increase in the cost of living when they 
were relocated from an island to the mainland, therefore increasing their vulnerabilities to 
economic stresses.  In both of these cases, villagers’ incomes have influenced these 
specific changes in social vulnerabilities brought about by the reconstruction effort.  If 
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their incomes had been different, the changes in social vulnerabilities experienced by 
villagers would also be different.  For example, if villagers had a higher income then they 
would have had less of an increased vulnerability to economic stresses when moved to 
the mainland where the cost of living was higher. 
The third social demographic that we have identified that has influenced changes 
in social vulnerabilities was family structure.  As seen in Finding #8, all of the villagers 
interviewed in Ban Talay Nok, Ban Chai Pattana, and Ban Tub Nua mentioned that two 
story houses were a problem for the elderly.  Also, most villagers surveyed in Ban Talay 
Nok believed their houses were too small for their needs.  These results have helped us 
identify family structure, which we define as being family size and also age distributions 
in the family, as being an important factor in influencing changes in social vulnerabilities.  
In these cases, organizations’ choices in the design of the houses did not adequately 
address villagers’ family structures.  If the family structure of the villagers had been 
different, then villagers would not be experiencing these same problems.  For example, if 
there were no elderly people living in the villages, two story houses would not have been 
a problem.   
4.4 Summary 
Through an analysis of the reconstruction approaches used and the changes in 
social vulnerabilities villagers are experiencing, we have identified four major 
relationships between reconstruction approaches and changes in social vulnerabilities.  
The first relationship we have identified is that when villagers were not involved in the 
reconstruction process, most villagers became more dependent on others for house 
maintenance and repair.  The next relationship is that when villagers were not involved in 
the reconstruction process, many villagers felt that their houses did not suit their needs 
and wants.  We have found that without any input in the design of the houses, most 
organizations did not take into account the needs and wants of the villagers, resulting in 
such things as open kitchens, which cause problems during the rainy season, and two 
story houses, which cause problems for the elderly.  The third relationship we identified 
is that when villagers were relocated due to land ownership or safety issues, they 
experienced both positive and negative changes in social vulnerabilities, ranging from 
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acquiring more modern houses or ownership of their land to occupational shifts and 
economic strains.  The last relationship we identified is that when houses were built with 
unsafe construction techniques and materials, some villagers did not trust the structural 
integrity of the houses.  Also, we have identified occupation, income, and family 
structure as being important social demographics that influenced the changes in social 
vulnerabilities brought about by the reconstruction effort. 
In addition to forming the causal relationships described above, we have also 
identified some approaches used by organizations that address issues other than housing 
and are related to changes in social vulnerabilities.  These reconstruction approaches are 
restoration of livelihoods, lack of coordination among government agencies, and lack of 
coordination between NGOs and government agencies.  We have found that some 
organizations have helped to restore villagers’ livelihoods, which we hypothesize has 
helped to reduce social vulnerabilities in these areas by alleviating some of the 
vulnerabilities brought about by the reconstructed houses.   
We believe that the lack of coordination among government agencies has resulted 
in government-built houses that did not adequately address the needs and wants of the 
villagers and therefore caused an increase in social vulnerabilities.  Additionally, there 
was little coordination between NGOs and government agencies, causing a disorganized 
reconstruction effort.  Since we were not able to fully explore these reconstruction 
approaches, we will offer recommendations for future researchers to further explore them 
in the next chapter. 
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5 Recommendations 
The findings presented in the last chapter have demonstrated that when certain 
reconstruction approaches were used, villagers’ social vulnerabilities increased.  When 
organizations did not involve villagers in the reconstruction, the houses did not suit the 
needs and wants of the villagers and also, villagers had an increased dependency on 
others for repairs.  When villagers were relocated, they experienced changes in social 
vulnerabilities, such as an increased vulnerability to economic stresses.  Also, we have 
identified occupation, income, and family structure as being important social 
demographics that influenced changes in social vulnerabilities.   
Based on our findings and background research, we offer a series of 
recommendations for organizations and government agencies that perform post-disaster 
reconstruction as well as recommendations for future research.  The first section below 
details our recommendations for organizations to help improve the outcomes of 
reconstruction in future efforts by ensuring that new homes better suit the needs of the 
residents and do not increase vulnerabilities.  The second section outlines our 
recommendations for future research to explore gaps in information that we have 
identified, as well as continue our work to find themes that can be generalized throughout 
the reconstruction effort in Thailand.  
5.1 Recommendations for Organizations and Government 
Agencies 
Through our findings, we have identified some recommendations that should be 
implemented by organizations to improve future reconstruction efforts.  These 
recommendations are presented below. 
5.1.1 NGOs and/or government agencies should seek to involve the 
affected community in the design and physical construction of the 
houses. 
Through our background research and field work, we have found that one of the 
most important, yet often overlooked aspects of reconstruction after a disaster is the 
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involvement of the community.  The community should be involved in the design of the 
individual houses, house layout, as well as the physical construction of the houses.  We 
have found that when villagers were involved in the reconstruction, the houses better suit 
their needs and villagers are less dependent on others for house repairs and modifications. 
As described in Finding #11, we have found that when the community was not 
involved in the reconstruction process, villagers are more dependent on others for repairs 
and modifications.  Congruent with the findings of DeMasi et al. (2006), our findings 
show that when villagers did not play a role in the reconstruction, they were often unable 
to repair and modify their homes because they had little or no knowledge of the materials 
and construction techniques used in their new homes.  DeMasi et al. (2006) also showed 
that when villagers were not involved in the reconstruction, they did not have the 
knowledge to care for their new structures, causing them to rely more on outside help.  
This increased villagers’ social vulnerability to dependency and in some cases, increased 
economic strain because some villagers could not afford to purchase materials or hire 
others for repairs.  In order to ensure that villagers are able to properly maintain their 
houses in the future, we recommend that NGOs and government agencies involve 
villagers in the reconstruction.   
Also, we found that when villagers were not involved in the reconstruction 
process, many villagers felt that their houses did not suit their needs and wants, as 
described in Finding #12.  Our research demonstrates that in some cases, there were 
simple design flaws that created problems for villagers.  For example, many houses had 
open kitchens, which caused problems for villagers in the rainy season.  In other cases, 
houses were built with two stories in an attempt to make them tsunami resistant; however 
this made it difficult for elderly members of the family to access the second story.   
Similar findings have also been identified by DeMasi et al. (2006), who found 
that when villagers were not involved in the reconstruction, the houses did not provide 
residents with sufficient space.  These problems caused villagers to make additions to 
their houses, which in many cases increased their dependency because they had to rely on 
an outside organization to build the addition.   
Past experiences have shown that involving the affected community in the 
reconstruction effort will ensure that the housing provided meets their needs (ALNAP, 
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2005).  For example, the reconstruction effort in Turkey following an earthquake in 1970 
did not involve the community.  Many residents were dissatisfied with the design, layout, 
and placement of the houses provided to them and began rebuilding new houses on their 
own (Mitchell, 1967).  On the other hand, when residents were able to design and 
construct their own house following an earthquake in Joyabaj, Guatemala, they were 
pleased with the outcomes (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989).  This further demonstrates the 
fact that when the community is involved in the reconstruction process, the houses will 
better suit their needs.   
The community can best be involved in the design of the houses through direct 
interviews with community members or focus groups held within the community.  If it is 
impossible to speak to individual community members, community leaders, such as the 
head of the village, should be consulted because he/she can best communicate the 
community’s needs (Walter, 2005, OECD, 1996). 
Organizations can involve the community in the construction of the houses by 
requiring or requesting that each community member work a certain number of hours on 
the construction of their own home.  This can be done through a written or verbal 
contract.  This practice has been used by Habitat for Humanity, as described in Finding 
#1, and appears to have been successful.   
5.1.2 If a community must be relocated, NGOs and/or government 
agencies should choose the location that minimizes negative 
impacts on residents’ lives and livelihoods. 
The location of a community is an important first step to reconstruction, and must 
be decided upon with as much care as any other major decisions.  In some cases, it is 
necessary to relocate a community due to safety and/or land ownership issues, as 
demonstrated in Finding #2.  All of the villages we studied that were relocated are now 
much safer than before the tsunami because they are no longer in the tsunami inundation 
zone.  However, there can be negative consequences associated with relocation because 
of new economic stresses and possible effects on the community’s occupation.   
We found that when villagers were relocated, they often experienced changes in 
social vulnerabilities, as described in Finding #13.  These changes in vulnerabilities were 
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positive, such as land ownership and a better education system, and negative, such as 
disruptions to occupations and increased economic strain.  For example, in the villages 
we studied, most villagers were fishermen, whose occupations were disrupted when they 
were relocated farther from the water.  These villagers are unable to spend as much time 
fishing as before the tsunami, therefore causing their income to decline, and making them 
more vulnerable to economic stresses.  Additionally, many villagers experienced an 
increase in cost of living, as described in Finding #9, thus further increasing their 
vulnerabilities to economic stresses. 
We recommend that if a community must be relocated, organizations should 
consider the social, cultural, and economic needs of the community.  They should choose 
the location that best minimizes disruptions to residents’ lives and livelihoods.   
5.1.3 When NGOs and/or government agencies make decisions regarding 
the relocation or design of houses, they should consider the social 
demographics of the community, most importantly occupation, 
income, and family structure. 
As described in Finding #14, we identified three important social demographics 
that influenced changes in social vulnerabilities brought about by the reconstruction 
effort.  These three social demographics are: occupation, income, and family structure.  
In order to best take into account villagers’ needs and wants and to minimize social 
vulnerabilities, we recommend that reconstruction organizations take into account these 
social demographics.   
We found that in some cases, when communities were relocated, villagers’ 
occupations suffered.  In our case studies, we were told that many of the fishermen that 
were relocated were unable to fish as frequently as they did before the tsunami, which has 
greatly hurt their incomes, as described in Finding #9.  With a change in occupation, 
incomes may suffer greatly, preventing residents and their families from purchasing 
goods that they may need to survive and thus increasing their social vulnerabilities to 
economic stresses. 
When a person’s occupation is disrupted, their social vulnerabilities are increased 
as they become susceptible to losing their main source of income.  A loss of income can 
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have huge repercussions on people’s lives, forcing them to alter their lifestyle by seeking 
alternate occupations or reducing their spending.  In order to best incorporate 
occupational needs into the design of the houses, NGOs and/or government agencies 
should directly speak to the disaster affected people to first identify what the main 
occupations of the community are.  Organizations can learn about the community’s 
occupation and how this affects their housing needs by speaking directly to community 
members through interviews or focus groups.  Also, background research should be done 
to learn more about the area’s major occupations. 
Along with occupation, we have also found that income is an important factor that 
may influence changes in vulnerabilities.  A community’s income may affect the amount 
of post-reconstruction work (whether it be repairs or additions) that they can perform on 
their house.  We have found that when the materials and construction techniques used in 
the new houses were different than the villagers’ pre-tsunami houses, new expenses arose 
due to the additional repairs needed to be made on the houses, as described in Finding #7.  
Also, we have found that when villagers were relocated, new expenses arose due to an 
increase in the cost of living, as described in Finding #9.   With new economic strains, the 
affected people become burdened because they experience an increased vulnerability to 
economic stresses, forcing them to rely on new forms of income.   
Reconstruction organizations should first identify the average income of the 
community by asking residents directly through interviews and focus groups.  They 
should consider materials and construction techniques that will not cause excess 
economic strain on the affected people.  This can be done through research into the 
various choices for housing materials and construction techniques and by performing a 
cost estimate of possible future repairs.  If relocation is necessary, NGOs and/or 
government agencies should choose a location that does not greatly increase the cost of 
living for community members.   
The final social demographic that we have identified as being important in 
influencing changes in social vulnerabilities is family structure, by which we mean 
family size and age demographics of families.  We found that in the studied villages, 
elderly community members had specific needs.  Elderly members of the family needed 
to live on the ground floor of the house because it was difficult for them to use the stairs, 
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as described in Finding #8.  The houses in these communities were not designed for this 
because both bedrooms were located on the top floor.  Many families had to add 
additions to their houses to allow elderly family members to sleep on the ground floor.   
NGOs and/or government agencies performing reconstruction should gather 
information regarding the number of people and age brackets for each house.  This can be 
done by speaking directly to community members through interviews or focus groups.  
The needs of each age group should also be identified through interviews with 
community members and background research.  This information should be incorporated 
into the design of the house by making the house large enough for each family and by 
meeting the specific needs of various age groups. 
5.1.4 Coordination among government agencies should be improved. 
We have found that there was little to no coordination among the Thai 
government offices that participated in the reconstruction effort due perhaps to the 
magnitude of the disaster.  As described in Finding #3, decisions regarding the 
reconstruction of specific villages were handled at the provincial level, while the designs 
for the houses and general planning was handled by central government.  We have found 
that there was miscommunication between government officials at the provincial level 
and those in the central government.  For instance, the Bureau of Architecture in the 
Ministry of Interior believes that villagers chose the designs for their houses, while the 
director of the Ranong province office told us that the Royal Thai Air Force chose the 
designs.  By speaking to villagers in three villages reconstructed by the Thai government, 
we have learned that villagers did not have a choice for the design of their homes.  The 
intention of Suchart Trisatayapan, the director of the Bureau of Architecture, was to 
allow the villagers to choose the design for their houses (out of four possible designs) in 
order to ensure that they were given a house that met their needs.  However, this intention 
was probably lost as instructions were passed down a long chain of command. 
When the necessity for post-disaster reconstruction arises in the future, we 
recommend that the Thai government improve communication between the central and 
provincial governments.  To avoid any miscommunications, the reconstruction goals and 
processes should be clearly laid out and conveyed during the beginning phases of the 
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reconstruction.  This will help ensure that the intentions of one government agency are 
understood and passed on to other government agencies.  With improved 
communications and clearer objectives, the government-built houses may better prevent 
further increases in social vulnerabilities and better suit the needs of the affected people. 
5.1.5 Coordination between government agencies and NGOs should be 
improved.  
Additionally, we have found that there was no coordination between the 
government agencies and NGOs participating in the reconstruction effort, as described in 
Finding #4.  Since the former Prime Minister refused international aid, government 
officials did not work with NGOs during the reconstruction effort because they felt that 
doing so would violate the Prime Minister’s policies.  Following the tsunami, NGOs had 
to contact local authorities, such as those in the provincial offices, to establish specific 
sites that they could reconstruct.  (We are unsure exactly how the process worked for 
assigning NGOs to specific villages.)  From our interviews, we have learned that no 
records of the reconstruction were kept within the central government and we are unsure 
if any were kept at the provincial level. 
From a previous study it has been noted that in Ban Tub Nua and Ban Hat Sai 
Khao of the Ranong province, villagers should have been provided with village 
representatives from local NGOs that they could contact for questions or problems.  
However, most villagers did not know who their representative was or how to contact 
him/her (DeMasi et al., 2006).  Both of these villages were reconstructed by the Thai 
government and therefore we hypothesize that the problem of villagers being unaware of 
their local representatives has resulted from a lack of coordination between Thai 
government agencies and local NGOs.   
Past experience has demonstrated that those performing reconstruction following 
a disaster need to work together to plan, coordinate, and organize the effort (Walter, 
2005, OECD, 1996).  To ensure that the reconstruction effort is properly coordinated, it is 
recommended that there is a single coordinator to act as a liaison between all 
participating parties (Walter, 2005).  Therefore, we recommend that in the event of a 
future reconstruction effort, the Thai government appoint a person or group of people 
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(depending on the size of the affected area) to act as the coordinator for the 
reconstruction effort.  Having a coordinator will help ensure that central documents are 
kept of the NGOs that performed reconstruction and where they worked, which may be 
important for villagers, the government, or future interested parties to know.  The 
coordinator will also be able to act as a liaison between different NGOs and government 
agencies, ensuring that all organizations work together to make the reconstruction effort 
run as smoothly as possible.  Therefore, NGOs will not waste time performing logistical 
work because they will only need to contact the coordinator, rather than trying to contact 
local authorities at the provincial and possibly even village level.   
5.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
Because this was a small scale research project, future research is needed to fully 
understand how the reconstruction approaches used by organizations relate to the changes 
in social vulnerabilities villagers are experiencing.  Working to complete this analysis 
will provide researchers and reconstruction organizations with a greater understanding of 
the social aspects that can influence the outcome of a reconstruction effort.  
5.2.1 Researchers should continue gathering information regarding the 
reconstruction effort in other villages to determine if our findings can 
be generalized.   
In order to determine if our findings can be generalized to accurately describe the 
post-tsunami reconstruction effort in Thailand, researchers should seek to gather 
additional information regarding the reconstruction approaches used by organizations and 
the changes in social vulnerabilities villagers are experiencing.  Since this was a small-
scale research study, we were not able to gather data from a wide range of organizations 
or villages.  Future research should expand upon this study by gathering information 
regarding other organizations and other villages.  Also, other social demographics that 
may have influenced changes in social vulnerabilities brought about by the reconstruction 
effort should be identified.  To accomplish this, future studies should be expanded to 
include all six tsunami-affected provinces.   
As additional research is gathered, the database created by this project should be 
continuously updated.  The database is a working system that should be updated 
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constantly for other researchers and organizations to use to gather information.  In this 
way, the findings from various researchers will be stored in a central location, allowing 
comparisons from different sets of data to be made.  
5.2.2 Researchers should explore the relationships between 
organizations’ efforts to restore livelihoods and changes in villagers’ 
social vulnerabilities. 
As described in Finding #6, we found that some organizations, such as Save 
Andaman, NATR, and USAID have helped to restore villagers’ livelihoods by repairing 
boats for fishermen, providing villagers with revolving funds, establishing eco-tourism 
systems, and by providing education about alternative livelihoods.  Since the focus of our 
project was the reconstruction of villagers’ houses, we were not able to fully explore how 
the restoration of livelihoods has affected villagers’ social vulnerabilities.  We 
hypothesize that organizations that helped to restore livelihoods have decreased social 
vulnerabilities because they have restored villagers’ occupations by helping fishermen to 
repair damaged boats and provided them with new means of income by offering 
alternative livelihoods.  Also, we did not explore how well the activities of these 
organizations were integrated into the reconstruction process.  We do not know if 
organizations that supported villagers’ livelihoods coordinated their efforts with 
organizations that performed reconstruction. 
Future researchers should gather information about the processes used by 
organizations to restore villagers’ livelihoods.  In order to understand exactly how this 
process has changed villagers’ social vulnerabilities, relationships should be established 
between the restoration of livelihoods and the changes in social vulnerabilities.  
Additionally, researchers should seek to understand how well livelihood restoration and 
housing reconstruction were coordinated.  With this information, recommendations can 
be made to improve the quality of livelihood restoration and to possibly suggest this 
practice to other organizations. 
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5.2.3  Researchers should further investigate the processes of 
coordination among government agencies used during the 
reconstruction effort.   
We have found that throughout the reconstruction effort, there was little 
coordination between various government offices, as described in Finding #3.  
Government officials in the central government informed us that villagers had a choice in 
the design of their houses, while those at the provincial level told us that the Royal Thai 
Air Force chose the design.  When we talked to villagers, they explained to us that they 
had no choice in the design of their houses.  Through our research, we have found that 
there was some miscommunication between government officials at the national and 
provincial levels, although we have not been able to identify exactly why this occurred or 
how it affected the reconstruction process and the outcomes of the reconstruction.   
Future researchers should seek to understand the reconstruction processes that 
produced the government built houses.  In order to understand the complete process, they 
should focus on gathering information from the central and provincial governments and 
comparing this to information gathered from villagers.  Once the process that occurred is 
understood, further recommendations can be made to government officials to improve the 
process in the event of a future reconstruction effort. 
5.2.4 Researchers should assess the physical safety of the construction 
techniques and materials used in the houses to determine the 
dangers villagers face.   
As described in our findings section, we found that some houses appeared to be 
poorly constructed or unsafe, as described in Finding #5.  In some villages, we noticed 
problems resulting from poor construction, such as broken ceiling tiles and cracks in the 
walls and ceilings.  In other villages we noticed more serious problems, such as un-
reinforced second floors and asbestos roofs.  If ignored, these problems could pose 
serious problems for villagers, creating increases in social and physical vulnerabilities.  
Problems resulting from poor construction may require villagers to perform additional 
repairs, which may be impossible for them given their income or knowledge of the 
structures and materials.  The more serious problems could have severe long term effects 
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on villagers’ lives.  For example, the asbestos roofing could have health impacts on the 
villagers, especially the younger generations since they will be living in these houses for 
a long period of time.   
Since we were not qualified to determine if the houses are really unsafe, 
researchers should perform physical assessments of the houses to determine the extent of 
the problem.  Once this is done, further recommendations should be made both to 
villagers and organizations in order to address to the current situation, as well as to 
prevent the occurrence of future problems. 
5.3 Summary 
Based on our findings, we have identified recommendations for reconstruction 
organizations and for future research.  The recommendations we offer to reconstruction 
organizations are intended to ensure that future reconstruction efforts produce houses that 
meet the needs and wants of the residents do not increase social vulnerabilities.  It is 
important that organizations involve the community in the reconstruction process as 
much as possible.  By involving the community, they will ensure that the houses suit the 
needs of the affected people and also that residents will be able to repair and modify their 
own houses in the future.  If a community must be relocated to another area, 
organizations should choose the location with minimal affects on residents’ livelihoods.  
Organizations should consider the social demographics of the community, most 
importantly occupational profile, income structure, and family structure.  Finally, 
communication should be improved among government agencies and between NGOs and 
government agencies. 
Since we were not able to perform an in-depth study of all tsunami-affected 
villages in Thailand, we also offer recommendations to future researchers to continue our 
work.  We recommend that researchers continue our work, by visiting additional tsunami-
affected villages, interviewing additional organizations, and adding to our database.  We 
recommend that researchers seek to better understand the process that organizations used 
to restore villagers’ livelihoods, as well as understand how this has affected changes in 
villagers’ social vulnerabilities.  We also recommend that researchers further investigate 
the processes by which the government designed and built the reconstructed houses.  
  66  
Finally, we recommend that researchers assess the physical safety of the houses to 
determine the dangers that may be present.    
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6 Conclusion  
By performing archival research and case studies in six tsunami-affected villages 
in Southern Thailand, we have found that when NGOs and government agencies use 
certain reconstruction practices, houses do not meet villagers’ needs and wants and will 
cause an increase in social vulnerabilities.  In many cases, when villagers were not 
involved in the reconstruction process, the houses did not suit their needs and they were 
more dependent on others for house repairs and modifications.  We found that when 
villages were relocated, many villagers experienced increased vulnerabilities due to 
occupational shifts and new economic strains.  Additionally, we have identified 
occupation, income, and family structure as being the important social demographics that 
influenced the changes in vulnerabilities that were created by the reconstruction effort.   
 From these findings, we offered recommendations to government agencies and 
NGOs to improve the outcomes of future reconstruction efforts by ensuring that the new 
structures meet residents’ needs and do not further increase their social vulnerabilities.  
First, we recommend that government agencies and NGOs seek to involve the 
community in reconstruction to ensure that residents can modify and repair the new 
houses as needed, as well as ensuring that it best suits their needs.  We also recommend 
that if a village must be relocated, government agencies and NGOs choose a location that 
has minimal impact on their lives and livelihoods and does not increase social 
vulnerabilities.  Finally, we have identified three important social demographics that 
should be taken into consideration during the reconstruction process – occupation, 
income, and family structure.  
The recommendations that we have offered to government agencies and NGOs 
performing reconstruction may be applied to any reconstruction effort, regardless of the 
country or type of natural disaster.  The problems we have seen in our case study villages 
are not isolated incidents.  They have been observed by other researchers studying post-
tsunami reconstruction in other villages in Thailand.  Also, many of the same problems 
have been seen during reconstruction efforts of past disasters throughout the world.  The 
challenge for reconstruction organizations is to focus on providing communities with 
long-lasting solutions by minimizing future vulnerabilities and promoting livelihoods, 
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rather than focusing on short term needs.   It is our hope that our findings and database 
will help to improve future reconstruction efforts and further organizations’ contributions 
to humanity.   
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APPENDIX A – Semi-structured Interview Questions for 
Organizations 
1. What were your goals throughout this process?   
a. Do you believe that they were achieved? 
i. How did you achieve them?   
2. Before beginning the reconstruction, did you have pre-set plans for the design of the 
houses?   
a. If so, how did you develop these plans? 
3. Before beginning the reconstruction, did you have pre-set plans for the layout of the 
village?   
a. If so, how did you develop these plans? 
4. If you didn’t have pre-set plans, how did you decide upon the design, layout, and 
materials for the structures? 
a. Did the villagers provide any input on the design, layout, or materials? 
i. How did you get input from the villagers?  With a focus group?  Individual 
Interviews? 
5. Were the villagers involved in the physical construction of the houses?   
a. If so, how were they involved? 
6. What sort of materials did you construct with?   
a. Where did you obtain these materials? 
b. Are these materials familiar to the villagers? 
7. Besides the basic needs of shelter, what were the characteristics of villagers’ lives that 
were considered in the design/layout of these houses? 
a. Religion? 
b. Occupation? 
c. Ethnicity? 
d. Education? 
e. Economic status? 
f. Family structure? 
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APPENDIX B – Semi-Structured Village Interview 
Questions 
1. Who rebuilt your house? 
2. What do you like about your new house? 
a. What is your favorite aspect of your new house? 
3. What do you dislike about your new house? 
4. Is there anything that worries you about your new house?   
a. What problems do you see? 
5. Do you feel that your new house supports your needs better or worse than your old 
house did?  
a. What needs do you feel are not adequately met? 
6. Is your new house on the same land as your old house?   
a. If not, do you feel this is a problem?   
i. Why do you think it is a problem?   
ii. Do you know why the location was changed? 
b. Did you own the land your old house was built on? 
c. Do you own the land your new house is built on? 
7. Were you asked about your needs so your new house would better suit your needs? 
a. If so, what needs were you asked about? 
b. Were you asked your opinion about the design of your house? 
8. Did you or anyone in your household choose the design of your house?   
9. Did you, or anyone in your household, assist with the construction of your new 
house? 
10. To what extent do you feel that you will be able to fix, repair, and maintain your new 
house? 
a. Have you made any repairs to your house? 
i. Did you make them yourself or hire someone?  If you hired someone, who 
was it? 
b. Do you know where to access materials to repair your house, if necessary? 
i. Would you be able to afford these materials? 
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11. Do you often contact outside agencies/people for repairs and maintenance?   
a. If yes, who do you contact? 
b. If not, would you contact someone if you had the resources to do so? 
12. Is the layout of the village after the reconstruction different than before? 
a. If so, how did it change? 
i. How do you feel about the new layout? 
 
  75  
APPENDIX C – Village Survey (English)  
 
Questionnaire Questions: 
 
1.  Name: ______________ 
 
2.  How old are you?  _________         Village: ________________ 
 
3.   How many people live in your home?  _________ 
 
4. Who built your house? 
   I built it myself. 
   The Government. 
   Other relief organization. Name of organization _______________ 
 
5. Was your family asked for its opinion on the design of your new house?  
  Yes 
  No 
   Unsure 
 
6. Were you or your family presented with a choice of designs for your new house? 
  Yes 
  No 
  Unsure 
 
7. Did you or someone in your family help construct your house? 
   Yes 
   No 
  Unsure 
 
8. Do you feel your house has sufficient space for your family’s living needs? 
   Yes 
   No 
 
9. Is your new house larger, smaller, or about the same size as your old house? 
   Larger. 
   Smaller. 
   About the same size. 
 
10. Has your family added any additions or made any major changes to your house since 
it was rebuilt?  
  Yes 
  No 
 
11. Are you satisfied with your new house, or are you unhappy with the outcome. 
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   I am satisfied with my new house. 
   I am unhappy with the outcome. 
 
12. Do you, or someone in your family, feel you know enough about the structure of your 
new house and the materials it is made out of, to make repairs in the future? 
   Yes 
   No 
 
13. Do you feel you have the ability to obtain the materials necessary to make repairs on 
your house? 
   Yes, I feel I can obtain the material necessary. 
   No, I do not feel I can. 
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APPENDIX D – Village Survey (Thai) 
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APPENDIX E – Table of Organizations  
ORGANIZATION PROVINCE 
DISTRICT 
(AMPHOE) 
SUB-DISTRICT 
(TAMBON) 
VILLAGE 
NUMBER OF 
HOUSES 
DATE OF WORK 
Koh Khor Kao Nok Nah - Village 2 3 Feb 2005 - May 
2005 
Bang Muang Bang Muang - Village 
4 
41 Feb 2005 - April 
2005 
4Kali 
Phang Nga Takua Pa 
Khuk Khak Bang Niang - Village 5 2 March 2005 - Jan 
2005 
Bang Gluay - Village 3 4 Aug 2005 - Oct 
2005 
Ranong Suk Samran Naka 
Na Pru - Village 2 7 Aug 2005 - Oct 
2005 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency 
(ADRA) 
Phang Nga Takua Pa Bang Muang Bang Mor - Village 3 4 Sept 2005 - Nov 
2005 
Beluga School for Life Phang Nga Thai Muang Thung Maprow Nah Nai -Village 4 20 Jan 2005 - present 
Catholic Mission of Surat Thani Phang Nga Khuraburi UNKNOWN Chum Chon Tap-Parat 42 unknown 
Khuk Khak Thung Wah - Village 5 71 Dec 2004 - Oct 
2005 
Takua Pa 
Bang Muang Nam Khem - Village 2 103 Jan 2006 - 
unknown 
Phang Nga 
Khuraburi Khura Pak Triam - Village 4 23 unknown 
Suk Samran Kom Puan Talay Nok - Village 1 3 Dec 2004 - Feb 
2005 
Ranong 
Muang Ngao Had Sai Dum - Village 
5 
29 unknown 
Thalang Mai Kao Ta Chatchai - Village 5 51 March 2005 - June 
2005 
Muang Radsada Koh Si Leh - Village 1 109 unknown 
Phuket 
Kathu Pathong Klong Bak Bang 
Community 
16 unknown 
Koh Lan Dah  Koh Lan Dah Yai Hua Laem - Village 1 36 unknown 
Community Organizations Development 
Institute (CODI) 
Krabi 
Muang Ao Nang Koh Phi Phi - Village 7 22 unknown 
Farang Jai Dee 
Phang Nga Khuraburi Mae Nang Kao Ban Nai Tiuew - 
Village 7 
32 unknown 
Habitat for Humanity 
Phang Nga Takua Pa Khuk Khak Bang La-Own - Village 
7 
36 
Mar 2005 - Nov 
2005 
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 Bang Nai Si 
Pru Tiow - Village 7 60 
Apr 2005 - Oct 
2005 
Thung Maprow 
Koh Nok - Village 2 65 
Oct 2005 - Oct 
2006 
Laem Pi 
Laem Pi - Village 4 15 
Jan 2006 - May 
2006 
Laem Kaen Tah Din Dang - Village 
4 
28 
Mar 2006 - Oct 
2006 
Yai Nin - Village 3 
unknown Oct 2006 - Aug 
2007 
Bang Klee - Village 8 
unknown Oct 2006 - Aug 
2007 
 
Thai Muang 
Nah Duey 
Nah Fek - Village 9 
unknown Oct 2006 - Aug 
2007 
Mai Khao 
Thachatchai - Village 5 91 
Feb 2005 - Feb 
2006 
Thalang 
Tep Kah Sat Dree Khok Sae - Village 1 8 Jul 2006 - Oct 2006 
Phuket 
Muang Rat Sah Dah 
Koh Si Leh - Village 1 36 
Apr 2006 - Oct 
2006 
UNKNOWN 
UNKNOWN 79 
Mar 2006 - Sep 
2006 
Talay Nok - Village 1 
unknown Oct 2006 - Aug 
2007 
Nua - Village 2 
unknown Oct 2006 - Aug 
2007 
Kam puan - Village 3 
unknown Oct 2006 - Aug 
2007 
Phu Khao Tong - 
Village 4 
unknown Oct 2006 - Aug 
2007 
Suk Sam Ran - Village 
5 
unknown Oct 2006 - Aug 
2007 
Don Gloy - Village 6 
unknown Oct 2006 - Aug 
2007 
Ranong Suk Sam Ran 
Kam puan 
Had Sai Kao - Village 
7 
unknown Oct 2006 - Aug 
2007 
Hin Kao - Village 1 
unknown Nov 2006 - Aug 
2007 
Ao Nam - Village 2 
unknown Nov 2006 - Aug 
2007 
Laem Sak - Village 3 
unknown Nov 2006 - Aug 
2007 
 
Krabi Ao Luk Laem Sak 
Samilah - Village 4 
unknown Nov 2006 - Aug 
2007 
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Klong Rad - Village 5 
unknown Nov 2006 - Aug 
2007 
    
Nai Sai - Village 6 
unknown Nov 2006 - Aug 
2007 
Bang Sak Dai - Village 
7 16 
Jul 2005 - Sep 
2006 
Takua Pa Bang Muang 
Bang Muang - Village 
4 1 
Aug 2006 - Aug 
2006 
Khuraburi UNKNOWN 
UNKNOWN 
1 
Apr 2005 - Jun 
2005 
Thai Muang 
Tah Saw - Village 5 
1 
Apr 2005 - Jun 
2005 
Loung Marc 
Phang Nga 
Thai Muang 
Laem Pi 
Laem Pi - Village 4 
1 
Feb 2005 - Sep 
2006 
Nam Khem - Village 2 59 Jun 2005 - Nov 
2006 
Takua Pa Bang Muang 
Tap Tawan - Village 7 31 unknown - Jul 2005 
Phang Nga 
Takua Thung Khok Kloi Talat Kok Kloi - Village 
1 
1 Apr 2005 - Aug 
2006 
Malteser International 
Trang Kan Tang Koh Li Bong Koh Muk - Village 2 148 Jun 2006 - Jun 
2007 
Operation Blessing Thai 
Krabi Nua Klong Koh Sri Boya Koh Jum - Village 3 6 May 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Thalang Choeng TaLay Bang Tao - Village 2 104 Jan 2005 - July 
2005 
Phuket Tsunami Recovery Fund 
Phuket 
Kathu UNKNOWN Kamala Village 6 March 2005 - June 
2005 
Rotary Club Patong Beach 
Phang Nga Khuraburi Khura Pak Triam - Village 9 23 unknown - Sept 
2005 
Takua Pa Bang Nai Si Pru Tiow - Village 7 80 Dec 2004 - Dec 
2005 
Phang Nga 
Thai Muang Nah Duey Nai Rai - Village 7 60 Dec 2004 - March 
2005 
Rotary Club of Phang Nga 
Krabi Nua Klong Koh Sri Boya Koh Jum - Village 3 20 Oct 2005 - May 
2006 
Bang Muang Nam Khem - Village 2 11 June 2005 - June 
2006 
Sahathai Lutheren Takua Pa 
Phang Nga Takua Pa 
Bang Nai Si Pru Tiow - Village 7 1 April 2006 - June 
2006 
Koh Kor Khao Ban Nog Na - Village 2 4 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Save Andaman 
Phang Nga Takua Pa 
Bang Muang Tab Tawan - Village 7 47 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
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Laem Pom - Village 2 33 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
  
Nam Khem - Village 2 15 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Koh Pratong Ban Trung Dap - 
Village 1 
16 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
 
Khuraburi 
Nah Duey Nai Rai - Village 7 35 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Koh Lao - Village 6 20 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Ranong Muang Bak Nam 
Koh Sin Hai - Village 4 11 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Rat Sah Dah Khok Sai - Village 1 112 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Phuket Muang 
Koh Kaew Sa Pam - Village 1 40 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Si Gao Khao Mai Kaew Leam Sai - Village 3 2 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Had Sam Ran Dah Sae Dah Sae - Village 4 1 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Kuan Dung Gu - 
Village 3 
8 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Trang 
Kan Tang Bang Sak 
Nam Raab - Village 4 1 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Klong Yang Sang Gah Ouh - 
Village 7 
32 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Krabi Koh Lanta 
Koh Lanta Yai Sri Ra Ya - Village 2 11 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
La Ngu Bak Nam Bow Jed Luuk - Village 
1 
4 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Dan Yong Umah - 
Village 1 
1 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Bah Gan Yai - Village 
2 
2 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Dan Yong Gling - 
Village 3 
1 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Ya Ra Dod Nui - 
Village 4 
4 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
 
Satun 
Muang Koh Sah Rai 
Ya Ra Dod Yai - 
Village 5 
4 Jan 2005 - Jan 
2006 
Secours Populaire Française Phang Nga Khuraburi UNKNOWN Ban Tarnkirin unknown unknown 
Social Pastoral Center 
Phang Nga Khuraburi Mae Nang Kao Bang Dad - Village 7 42 May 2005 - Nov 
2006 
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 Bang Wan Bang Wan - Village 1 unknown May 2005 - March 
2006 
Bang Sak Dai - Village 
8 
16 May 2005 - March 
2006 
Bang Muang 
Nam Khem - Village 2 unknown May 2005 - March 
2006 
Khuk Khak Bang Niang - Village 5 33 May 2005 - March 
2006 
Koh Kor Khao UNKNOWN unknown May 2005 - March 
2006 
Kanim - Village 7 unknown May 2005 - March 
2006 
  
Takua Pa 
Thung Maprow 
UNKNOWN unknown May 2005 - March 
2006 
Takua Pa Koh Khor Khao Muang Mai - Village 1 8 Jan 2006 - Sept 
2006 Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC) 
Phang Nga 
Khuraburi Koh Pratong Tah Pah Yoi - Village 2 16 Aug 2005 - March 
2006 
Kapoe Muang Gluang Aow Kuey 42 unknown 
La Un Nai Wong Nua Tub Nua 69 unknown 
Talay Nok 22 unknown 
Ranong 
Suk Samran Kom Puan 
Had Sai Dum 52 unknown 
Khuraburi UNKNOWN Ban Chai Pattana 130 unknown 
Many 453 unknown 
Phang Nga 
Takua Pa Bang Muang 
Bang Lud 150 unknown 
Koh Muak 25 unknown 
Mod Dah Noi  5 unknown 
Kan Trang Kho Li Bong 
UNKNOWN 2 unknown 
Trang 
Pa Lian Ko Su Korn UNKNOWN 1 unknown 
Chalong  Bah Lai  10 unknown 
Rad Sah Dah  Laem Tuk Kae 24 unknown 
Muang Phuket  
Rawai  Koh Loan  5 unknown 
Choeng Talay  Had Surin 16 unknown 
Mai Kao Tah Chad Chai 36 unknown 
Phuket 
Thalang 
Sah Loo Sah Loo 1 unknown 
Koh Lanta Koh Lanta Yai Hua Laem 80 unknown 
Thai Government 
Krabi 
Muang Krabi Ao Nang Koh Phi Phi 278 unknown 
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Nam Khem - Village 2 50 unknown 
Tap Tawan - Village 7 100 unknown 
Bang Muang 
Bang Sak Dai -Village 
7 
51 unknown 
Koh Kor Khao UNKNOWN 41 unknown 
Tsunami Volunteer Center (TVC) 
Phang Nga Takua Pa 
Khuk Khak Khao Lak - Village 7 30 unknown 
Nah Duey Bang Duey Dai - 
Village 7 
unknown Jan 2005 - Dec 
2006 
Thung Maprow Koh Nok - Village 2 unknown Jan 2005 - Dec 
2006 
Lom Kaen Lom Ru - Village 1 unknown Jan 2005 - Dec 
2006 
We Love Thailand 
Phang Nga Thai Muang 
Thai Muang Baan Theptharo unknown Jan 2005 - Dec 
2006 
Tap Tawan - Village 7 41 Dec 2004 - April 
2006 
Willi Hilft e.v. (Willi & Morgan) 
Phang Nga Takua Pa Bang Muang 
Ban Bon Rai - Village 
8 
7 March 2005 - April 
2006 
Lom Kaen Tah Din Dang - Village 
4 
unknown April 2005 - present 
Thai Muang Lom Pi - Village 6 unknown April 2005 - present 
Thung Maprow - 
Village 1 
unknown April 2005 - present 
Thai Muang 
Thung Maprow 
Koh Nok - Village 2 unknown April 2005 - present 
Khuk Khak Thung Wah - Village 5 unknown April 2005 - present 
Pru Tiow - Village 7 unknown April 2005 - present 
Takua Pa 
Bang Nai Si 
Bang Nai Sang - 
Village 5 
unknown April 2005 - present 
World Concern 
Phang Nga 
Khuraburi Bang Wan Thung La Ong - 
Village 4 
unknown April 2005 - present 
Nah Duey Nai Rai - Village 7 7 ongoing Thai Muang 
Lom Kaen Tab Lamu - Village 5 22 ongoing 
Phang Nga 
Takua Pa Bang Muang Nam Khem - Village 2 27 ongoing 
Ao Nang Koh Phi Phi - Village 7 160 ongoing Muang Krabi 
UNKNOWN UNKNOWN 17 ongoing 
World Vision Krabi 
Koh Lanta Koh Lanta Yai Sang Gah Ouh - 
Village 7 
91 ongoing 
 
